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ABSTRACT 
The Emergence of Civil Disobedience Movements in Hong Kong 
by 
CHAN Kwun Hong 
Master of Philosophy 
Civil disobedience, as a specific means of protest, has drawn intellectual attention 
worldwide, but few scholars in Hong Kong have studied this means of protest in 
depth. Focusing on the reasons why civil disobedience movements have emerged in 
Hong Kong, this research has used a case study methodology. Semi-structured 
interviews have been conducted with people that participated in many of Hong 
Kong’s previous civil disobedience movements, from the Yau Ma Tei Boat People 
Incident of the 1970s, to the Anti-Public Order Ordinance demonstrations and 
Citizens’ Radio Incident of the early 2000s. In addition to describing how the 
emergence of specific civil disobedience movements happened, this research also 
explores the sociopolitical conditions from which civil disobedience movements 
have emerged in the Hong Kong context. 
By interviewing key informants in each case (9 in total), a general pattern of the 
emergence of civil disobedience in Hong Kong has been found. Departing from the 
well-established studies on civil disobedience that have focused on the particular 
ideologies of participants or specific characteristics of movement leaders, this study 
contributes to the study of the sociopolitical conditions that led to emergence. All the 
cases studied point to the fact that the employment of civil disobedience as a protest 
means is a calculated response to delegitimizing effect, with the existence of civil 
society.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction: explaining the emergence of civil 
disobedience movements in Hong Kong 
1.1 Research Question 
There are many ways to put our demands to our government. In a democratic 
society, one can elect the head of the government, elect their representatives in the 
legislative branch, or, when one has access to them, lobby the decision-makers. If 
one cannot access power holders through institutional ways, one may protest or 
demonstrate on the street to proclaim publicly what one wants. This is what 
sociologists usually define as a social movement: “a collective attempt to further a 
common interest, or secure a common goal, through collective action outside the 
sphere of established institutions” (Giddens, 1989). But when will people choose to 
violate the law, the decrees, the legal commands of police or regulations collectively 
to further their common interests or goals?   
When people deliberately protest the law or the policy of government by 
violating it nonviolently, with the goal of changing the law or policy itself, the act is 
regarded as civil disobedience.1 And this means can be employed collectively to be a 
social movement. Civil disobedience movement must have been heard of by those 
who have heard about Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.  However, 
except those philosophers and intellectuals who defined it and debated about it, the 
concept is relatively vague to the ordinary citizen compared with other non-
institutional political acts like demonstrations, strikes - or, of course, elections - 
which may be a part of their routine life.  
                                                 
1 There is disagreement about the definition of civil disobedience. The detail will be discussed in the 
following part, which focuses on the nature of civil disobedience. Here, a relatively loose definition is 
provided first.  
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In academic circles, topics related to civil disobedience have been well 
discussed. The focus has ranged from the nature to the justification of the act.2 
Despite the enormous, cross-discipline efforts made by scholars from philosophy, 
political philosophy and legal theory, the contribution made by political scientists on 
civil disobedience has not been that fruitful. So, this study aims at answering the 
question “Why does civil disobedience movement emerge?” The question will be 
approached by finding the sociopolitical conditions under which civil disobedience 
has emerged, namely the necessary condition and sufficient condition. The necessary 
condition will be first examined with the case of a student organization, the White 
Rose, under a totalitarian regime (Nazi Germany). This case was chosen in order to 
show that, even though the student organization was doing what philosophers may 
count as civil disobedience, it was not, in fact, at all a significant one3 or hardly be 
counted as a movement.   
With reference to the history of India, the sufficient condition4 for emergence 
of civil disobedience movement will be examined. Finally, the discussion on civil 
disobedience movements in Hong Kong, with the support of interviews with 
participants, will constitute the last part of the thesis, to testify that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions have been found.  
                                                 
2 Also, the discussion on civil disobedience includes compatibility of the act and the constitutional 
democracy, which will not be discussed in this thesis as they are not directly related to the focus. 
3 The distinction between a significant and a not significant civil disobedience will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.  
4 Here the author of this thesis would like to stress the sufficient condition found in the following 
chapters cannot be tested separately. (e.g. whether AB, in other words, whether A condition can 
cause B on itself) It is because practically speaking, event potentially undermining moral authority of 
the regime cannot be turned into “Delegitimizing effect” (sufficient condition) if the civil society 
(necessary condition) has not existed. There is a certain kind of relation between the two conditions. 
So, the sufficient condition cannot be examined theoretically, in which necessary condition is non-
existing. More concrete discussion will be left in the specific chapter.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
The contemporary study of civil disobedience was started by philosophers in 
1961. A symposium named ‘Political Obligation and Civil Disobedience”, organized 
by the American Philosophical Association, was “…perhaps the first occasion on 
which the whole subject received formal attention from the academic community…” 
(Bedau, 1991, p. 3).  In his pioneering work On Civil Disobedience, Bedau (1961, p. 
653) made his own attempt to define civil disobedience and offer possible 
justifications - while he admitted that he was “…unable to find a suitably detailed 
analysis…” at the time.  
The founding definition provided by Bedau (1961, p. 661) was:  
“Anyone commits an act of civil disobedience if and only if he acts illegally, publicly, 
nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of 
his government.” 
Although the definition was controversial, Bedau had more or less made, what 
the author of this thesis calls, the minimalist definition of the concept of civil 
disobedience5. Also, he had provided the basic justification of the act. He claimed 
that one’s obligation to follow the law was not solely and sufficiently justified by the 
legal validity of the law. In other words, no one ever “…ought to do something just 
because it is the law…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 662). So, this justification only provided a 
right for one to act, it did not say that civil disobedience was always “…the right 
thing to do…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 663). At the time, Bedau claimed that he did not see 
a principle, which applied to all situations, that justified one’s obedience (or 
disobedience) (Bedau, 1961, p. 663). 
                                                 
5 “Minimalist definition” will be used later in chapter 4 and 5 in the discussion of the Yau Ma Tei 
Boat-People Incident in 1979.  
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When one traces back the develolpment of the field, one may discover that the 
trends in topics for discussion are largely confined to two problems; the nature of 
civil disobedience and its justification. 
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1.2.1 Nature of Civil Disobedience 
On the nature of civil disobedience, the discussion includes the purpose and the 
components. As we can see from the above definition made by Hugo A. Bedau in 
1961, the purpose of disobedience is to “…frustrate (one of ) the laws, policies, or 
decisions of his government”  
However, as Bedau highlighted in 1991, civil disobedience “…must be viewed 
as an exercise in public moral education, as a tactic to achieve law reform…” (Bedau, 
1991, p. 7). The public moral education can be understood with reference to the 
following:  
“… by making an appeal to conscience, the conscience of the authorities and especially the 
conscience of the majority of the public… Hence the disobedience is properly called ‘civil’ 
because it is part of the civic life of the society. But no such appeal to the public conscience 
can be made unless the illegal conduct is done openly, in the public form, as a political act…” 
(Bedau, 1991, pp. 6-7). 
The latter version put more emphasis on the purpose of civil disobedience 
(moral education). In other words, the purpose was crucial to “…turn some but not 
all disobedience into civil diosbedience…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 6). So, even though a 
person “…commits an act…” “…illegally…”, “…nonviolently…” and 
“…conscientiously with the intent to frustrate the laws, policies, or decisions of his 
government…”, he is not doing civil disobedience - as he is not doing it 
“…publicly…” and with the intent of “…moral education…”. With the latter version 
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of the definition, civil disobedience6 must be a process to make an appeal to others’ 
conscience.  
That’s why, in two senses, this type of law-breaking act cannot be personal (or 
can only be public). Firstly, it must be public (or open), meaning “…both the public 
and the government should know what he intends to do…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 655). In 
the second sense, the act has to aim at certain change in law or policy related to the 
“…civic life of the society…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7). This “purpose” is essential to 
distinguish civil disobedience from conscientious objection7. This distinction even 
casts doubt on what Henry David Thoreau did.  
This distinction of purpose makes the tax evasion of Thoreau, in order to show 
his discontent with the invasion to Mexico and slavery in the United States, look less 
like civil disobedience. Although tax evasion is a normal practise for civil 
disobedience, the purpose Thoreau did it makes a difference. Thoreau (1848) wrote 
this: 
“It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the eradication of any, even 
the most enormous wrong; he may still properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, 
at least, to wash his hands of it,…” 
It is obvious that the base for the act, by Thoreau’s word, is to not participate in 
injustice. In other words, it is hand-washing. Rather than being a model for others to 
follow (what moral education means), doing a tax evasion for “washing his hands” is 
not civil disobedience in Bedau’s eyes.  
                                                 
6 Please be reminded that civil disobedience discussed above has not yet been a collective movement. 
Bedau has discussed it in a personal perspective, whether one has an obligation to violate law when 
he/she thinks that’s wrong to follow.  
7 The distinction between civil disobedience and conscientious objection lies with the purpose. The 
former is for public education which aims to urge others to reconsider their support for the “unjust 
law”. The latter is for “personal hand-washing” and to avoid conduct “condemned by personal 
conscience” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7) 
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Even if a large enough proportion of a population follows their conscience and 
disobeys the government (in Thoreau’s thought), the ruling machine then cannot 
work in the face of the large friction (in Bedau’s words, “…frustrate the laws, polices 
or decisions of the government…”). That means the goal (of what the author of this 
thesis calls the minimalist definition), changing the law or policy, can still be served. 
However, within the debate of what civil disobedience is, even a large proportion of 
a population disobeying their government or a law they regard as unjust is not 
counted as civil disobedience in Bedau’s latter definition (what the author of this 
thesis calls maximalist definition), but just conscientious objection.8 As readers may 
see, only those disobeying with the purpose of changing laws and also exercising 
moral education should be named “civil” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7).  
Here we should have a little summary on the definitions mentioned above - due 
to their importance to the whole thesis. The author would regard the former 
definition made by Hugo A. Bedau in 1961 as a minimalist definition for people 
claiming they are carrying out civil disobedience. It is more or less a restriction on 
their behaviors: that is to be illegal, public, nonviolent and conscientious, but also 
with a basic intention to frustrate the laws, policies, or decisions of his government 
(Bedau, 1961). But, in the latter version made in 1991, a relatively strict requirement 
was added to the intention – that it is to be moral education. It has to be an appeal to 
another’s conscience (Bedau, 1991). In the author’s view, this is a maximalist 
definition.  
                                                 
8 Further discussion is out of the remit of this study. Here, the author would like to outline the 
complexity of the discussion with regard to purpose. As there are some scholars that define purpose 
more broadly, like Howard Zinn in his Disobedience and Democracy (New York: Random House, 
1968, p. 119), where he defines it as “…deliberate, discriminate violation of law for a vital social 
purpose…”, there are some scholars who ignore the debate with regard to purpose and focus on other 
issues, like Carl Cohen in his Civil Disobedience and the Law, where he refrains from defining civil 
disobedience with absolute precision but just as “…illegal, public protest, non-violent in character…” 
(1966, p. 2-3).  
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The components of the minimalist definition, like illegality, a public nature and 
a conscientious stance, will not be discussed here as they are not controversial. But a 
crucial element of the minimalist definition of civil disobedience, “violence”, has to 
be highlighted here. It is usual in the circle of philosophers that contributed to the 
discussion of civil disobedience to advocate the element of nonviolence in their 
definitions (Largely due to the widespread acceptance of the definition provided by 
Hugo Adam Bedau and John Rawls respectively).9 However, there are some 
philosophers that do not agree with taking this idea of nonviolence for granted. John 
Morreall has made an attempt to challenge this sensitive issue by providing an 
exploration of what violence is and, by offering an account of possible “justifiable 
violent acts”, voiced out a possibility of justifiable, violent civil disobedience 
(Morreall, 1976).  By pointing out the rather narrow traditional explanation of what 
violence has meant in academic circles, Morreall disagreed with confining violence 
to physical violence only (Morreall, 1976). Morreall contended that there are many 
ways which violence can be done to people without any physical contact, such as 
psychological harm or harming the property of a person, which will in turn harm the 
rights of him/her as a person.10 In other words, it constitutes an expansion of the very 
definition of violence. This expansion of the definition of violence makes doubtful 
some taken-for-granted ways of conducting civil disobedience, especially those 
originally regarded as nonviolent. For example, one may regard a sit-in as a 
                                                 
9 See Hugo A. Bedau, “On Civil Disobedience”, Journal of Philosophy (1961). Also, see John Rawls, 
“Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience”, In Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus 
(1991). Many practitioners will stick largely with the principle of nonviolence in order to show their 
pacifist ideas or to gain legitimacy from those well-known paragons of civil disobedience like Gandhi 
and King. However, as in the circle of philosophers, there is divergence on what is to be counted as 
violent. 
10 John Morreall pointed out that there is a possibility to harm an object which will not in turn harm 
one’s rights. One can think of harming your neighbor’s property (e.g. a new car) and a car which has 
been dumped in the city dump. Throwing a stone through the window of the former and latter would 
be greatly different acts. So, Morreall contended that destroying the latter should not be regarded as 
violence because neither human dignity nor the rights of a person were harmed. (Morreall, 1976, p. 
134) 
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nonviolent way to conduct civil disobedience. However, Morreall posed the question 
that if “…you and six hundred of your comrades refuse to leave one’s office building 
until he does “agree” to accept your demands…”, can it still be regarded as 
nonviolent? Is there any psychological harm done to him?  
After pointing out that acts originally conceptualized as nonviolent may be 
coercive (in that they also infringed the rights of a person), Morreall questioned the 
original justification for nonviolent civil disobedience in the light of the expanded 
definition (1976, p. 136). In other words, if we simply think that violent acts are not 
justifiable due to the infringement of another’s rights, we should also eliminate 
coercive acts in order to keep logically consistent.  
 Morreall went one step further and contended that we should simply endorse 
the possibility of a justifiable violent civil disobedience. His idea is made clearer 
with the following example: (1976, p. 137) 
“...the slave-owner chasing a runaway slave in the United States of the 1850s. If he has almost 
caught up with the slave, and my engaging him in a fistfight would give the slave the few precious 
minutes he needs to get away again, then I would be perfectly justified in grabbing the man and 
knocking him to the ground to give the slave the time he needs.” 
In the face of larger justice, a certain level of infringement of another’s rights 
(life or property) seems justifiable in his view. The point Morreall emphasized is that 
“…for the rights which physical violence or coercion violate, the rights which laws 
are set up to protect, are not absolute rights, but only, as we have been saying, prima 
facie rights” (1976, p. 137). Morreall explained more clearly with the following 
words:  
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In sum, Morreall had firstly provided a different definition of violence, which 
may include psychological harm, and, secondly, provided a justification for violent 
civil disobedience. In my opinion, Morreall did question the taken-for-granted ways 
of conducting civil disobedience, like sit-ins, which appear to be nonviolent at first 
sight. That made people reflect as to whether the originally “nonviolent” ways were 
really nonviolent. That’s his first contribution.  
However, with regard to his second contribution, it would be difficult to 
convince the public that they needed to tolerate your violent acts (within the 
circumstance that you first need convince them of why you need to violate the law). 
It would be really troublesome to convince the public you are conducting “moral 
education” on one hand while acting violently11 on the other. It is about an ability to 
be convincing. So, the author of this study would regard the choice between violent 
or nonviolent acts as a decision of calculation and tactics, but not especially a matter 
of principle. Morreall summed up it well: “…the significant line to be drawn here is 
between coercion and persuasion.” (1976, p. 136) 
As Hugo Bedau comments in his book: (1991, pp. 10-11) 
 “…John Rawls, who was perhaps the first philosopher really to devote careful thought to the 
nature and justification of civil disobedience from within the framework of a general theory of 
social justice and liberal democracy. The issues raised by Rawls’s approach concern not only 
all those already noticed but several others as well.” 
It is for sure that “nonviolence” would not be neglected by this founding theory 
in the field. Rawls indeed agreed that civil disobedience should be nonviolent (1971, 
p. 106). However, I would not agree that Rawls’s theory eliminated the possibility of 
                                                 
11 Violence here means not only physical violence, but also psychological, damaging one’s property. 
For example, in the wave against the Vietnam War in US, the anti-war activists burned the draft files 
in order to stop the invasion in Vietnam.  
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a violent civil disobedience. As Morreall’s comment on “traditional” theorists put it: 
(1976, p. 130) 
“Among these one of the most frequently mentioned is nonviolence. Some thinkers, like Bedau 
and Wasserstrom, require an act to be nonviolent before they will even count it as an act of 
civil disobedience;” 
It is extremely clear that Morreall believes that Bedau’s theory would eliminate 
all possibility of violent civil disobedience. However, I don’t think Rawls’s theory is 
firmly in agreement with this. Let’s scrutinize Rawls’s theory first.  
Rawls’s reasoning on the nature of “nonviolence” is simple. Civil disobedience 
is nonviolent for the reason that it is a “public act” which means that it is “…not only 
addressed to public principle, it is done in public…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 106). Rawls 
even overtly claimed that: (1971, p. 106) 
“It tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against persons, not from the abhorrence of the 
use of force in principle, but because it is a final expression of one’s case.”  
I think it is clear enough. It is just about “final expression”. Rawls is on the 
side advocating a nonviolent civil disobedience, but the reason why nonviolence is 
included in the definition is just a result of calculation, not an “abhorrence of use of 
force in principle”. So, the author of this thesis would weigh that the label civil 
disobedience can be applied to a movement if a movement is nonviolent in its final 
expression. In other words, whether it is largely or generally nonviolent. And here 
nonviolence would be regarded in the traditional sense - that is not to harm another’s 
body.  
As Morreall has expanded the definition of violence (like harming one’s 
property or psychological harm) and shown the possibility of justifiable violent civil 
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disobedience in the “slave-owner case” quoted above, the author of this thesis would 
hold the view that it seems to be justifiable to use a certain extent of violence in a 
case like that. While it is obviously harder to justify violent civil disobedience, the 
author of this thesis would not hold the view that it is impossible to combine violence 
with civil disobedience. Once the reason to use certain extent of violence is strong 
enough, it seems to be possible to use it to stop the larger evil.  
So, the author of this thesis would regard the element of nonviolence as one 
important element when classifying whether a movement is civil disobedience or not. 
Nonviolence, in the following chapters, would be in the sense of avoiding harm to 
another’s body and life in the final expression of the movement. It is just a general 
image or impression of the movement as a whole. The violation of another’s property 
rights would be weighed case by case, but the psychological harm raised by Morreall 
would not be taken in consideration. The definitions of civil disobedience will be 
used in this thesis for classifying whether one movement should be investigated 
empirically or not, the major thread of discussion will not be on the nature of the 
definitions.  
The philosophical debate on the definition of violence and its justification 
seems to be endless. But for this thesis regarding civil disobedience as a phenomenon, 
we have to get a definition which can be used for distinguishing which acts should be 
counted and which cannot. This thesis will choose a combination of both the 
minimalist definition of civil disobedience: 
“…illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the 
laws, policies, or decisions of his government…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 661) 
 and the maximalist definition: 
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“…educate the public what is ‘right’…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7)  
So, the above comprehensive definition will be employed for the ease of 
understanding and empirical analysis in the following passages.  
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 1.2.2 Justification of Civil Disobedience 
The justification of acts of civil disobedience is another realm for debate. 
Rawls’s ground-breaking work laid down three conditions for justifying civil 
disobedience.12 Locating the theory of civil disobedience within his Theory of Justice, 
Rawls put the first condition as “…infringements of the first principle of justice, the 
principle of equal liberty, and to blatant violations of the second part of the second 
principle, the principle of fair equality of opportunity…” (1971, p. 109). The 
expression of this in real-life institutions would be being “…denied the right to vote 
or to hold office, or to own property and to move from place to place, or when 
certain religious groups are repressed and others denied various opportunities…” 
(Rawls, 1971, p. 109).  
The second condition is when the “normal appeals” to the political majority 
have failed, and legal means have been proved of “no avail” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110). 
For instance, when the existing political parties have neglected the claims of a 
minority and they are unwilling/have no incentive to accommodate them. So, one 
may ask, should we justify an act of civil disobedience after employing each of every 
other legal means in the world? 
Rawls emphasized that it is not the case. He was not proposing that all the legal 
means needed to “…have been exhausted…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110). At the point 
when civil disobedience is justified, “…further normal appeals can be repeated; free 
speech is always possible. But if past actions have shown the majority immovable or 
                                                 
12 The conditions laid by John Rawls are conditions where justifiable civil disobedience can be 
grounded. In the author’s sense, it is not the same as conditions explaining why civil disobedience 
emerges. 
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apathetic, further attempts may reasonably be thought fruitless, and a second 
condition for justified civil disobedience is met…” (Rawls, 1971, p. 110). 13 
Rawls’s two conditions that are mentioned above are fundamental to my study 
in two senses. Firstly, he justified acts of civil disobedience in a nearly just society 
(where constitutional democracy is met). It grants the people within a nearly just 
society a right to engage in civil disobedience, but does civil disobedience emerge in 
this way? It has directed this study on searching the sociopolitical condition in which 
people may think normal means are proved to be “no avail”. Although the conditions 
above are mainly tackling a question of when civil disobedience is justified, the 
similar argument “civil disobedience emerges when normal and legal means are 
thought to be fruitless” is common when people try to explain why they would 
employ civil disobedience as a protest means. However, it is not really refutable. 
Further effort is needed to explain how this specific kind of movements emerge. It 
leads to the question of whether civil disobedience movements really emerges as a 
last resort, or whether it is really practical to launch civil disobedience when all other 
ways of protest have been used up or been proved fruitless. The author of this thesis 
tends to incline towards the view that when other normal or legal ways are shown14 
to be useless, it is more justifiable. But it is irrelevant to the explanation of its 
emergence. What we have to focus on is the sociopolitical conditions of its 
emergence. In other words, it is used because it is favored by conditions. And in 
author’s view, the above notion (legal ways proved no avail) will be more likely to 
germinate under such conditions. 
                                                 
13 The third condition will be kept to be short here. It is rather complicated. More or less, it is saying 
that when the two conditions are sufficient enough to justify, there would be more than one or even a 
lot of groups that may use civil disobedience. How to solve this problem where most of them are 
sufficiently justified? Rawls proposed an alliance among leaders. (Rawls, 1971, p. 111) 
14 Here it doesn’t mean the initiators have to try all of them, but at least to convince others with words.  
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So, this study will focus on what sociopolitical conditions (necessary and 
sufficient) would be for the participants to regard that the means, civil disobedience, 
might be effective and useful.  
1.2.3 Studies of social movements in Hong Kong and the related theories of 
emergence of social movements 
Studies of social movements are not and have never been the main focus on the 
stage called Hong Kong Studies. Due to the prevailing ‘political stability’ holding 
sway at the time,15 the central question to tackle has always been the “stability of the 
anachronistic colonial political system”. There has been no need to mention 
explanations of the emergence of social movements (Lui T.-l. &.-k., 2000, p. 2). So, 
the pioneers of the field have aimed at debunking the “myth” of political stability16 in 
some of their studies (Lui T.-l. &., 1997; 1999)  and also bringing social movements 
into view - as they had been neglected due to the high threshold of instability (Lui T.-
l. &.-k., 2000, p. 5).  
Departing from the myth, scholars studying social movements have been 
drawn to the series of social movements of the 1970s. They have studied social 
movements from the perspective of types17 and sometimes aggregately - as in the 
emergence of pressure group politics18. They have rarely put their focus on the 
means of protest.  
                                                 
15 Founded by classical studies like (King, 1981) and (Lau S.-k. , 1983).  
16 King claims clearly in his work, the concern of his paper is “the way Hong Kong’s political system 
has coped with the problem of stability” (King, 1984, p. 129). And Lau Siu-kai tackles the same 
“problem of political stability” by understanding the “typical normative and behavioral patterns of the 
Chinese majority” (Lau S.-k. , 1984, pp. 195-196). 
17 For instance, for student movements see (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1983) (Leung B. K.-p., 
1992). Urban social movement: see (Lui T.-l. , 1984) (Lui T.-l. &., 1985). Labor movement: see (Chiu, 
1987) (Leung B. K.-p., 1992).  
18 See (Lai T.-y. , 1984) (Lee, Hong Kong Politics and Society in Trasition, 1987) (Lee, 1984) 
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Lui has explained the reasons why social movements in 1970s emerged as a 
way of protest. He made use of the theory of the political opportunity structure model 
to understand the rise of protest actions in 1970s and its channel to formal 
institutional politics in 1980s. Simply put, the rise of protest action in 1970s was the 
result of the closed political structure and the decline of it was the opening of “…new 
political opportunities…” brought about by the special historical context (Lui T.-l. &., 
1997, pp. 104, 107).  
In fact, the theory of political opportunity structure shares the intellectual 
heritage from the resource mobilization theory. Both of the “schools” regard 
dissenters launching social movements as a rational attempts, after weighing the 
benefit and cost (McAdam, 1999, p. 37). Their difference lies with the focus they put, 
the former emphasizes the “larger sociopolitical environment” in which “movements 
develop in response to an ongoing process” (McAdam, 1999, p. 40)19. Despite of the 
difference mentioned, the author of this thesis would regard the theories as a 
guidance, but not constraint. So, both of the theories above would be employed 
throughout the analysis (especially when the favorable condition is being discussed).  
The larger sociopolitical environment, in my eye, would affect the cost and 
benefit of dissenters, for making their decision whether and when to launch a social 
movements. The process of decision making would follows: 
1. Collective action costs something. 
2. All contenders count costs. 
3. Collective action brings benefits, in the form of collective goods. 
4. Contenders continuously weigh expected costs against expected benefits. 
                                                 
19 The distinction between “schools” may be controversial as it is only the distinction made by the 
author mentioned.  
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5. Both costs and benefits are uncertain because (a) contenders have imperfect 
information about the current state of the polity; (b) all parties engage in 
strategic interaction. (Tilly, 1978, p. 99) 
The first four steps are simply the calculation on cost and benefit among the 
activists (or within their own mind). The last step is just the link between the larger 
sociopolitical condition and the calculation. So, the calculation can go in this way: 
 
The rise and decline of protest actions in Hong Kong have been better 
understood in the light shed by these studies. However, the studies on emergence 
were separated into types - for example, urban movements and labor movements. 
The means of protest has not been well studied20. The explanation of the emergence 
of protest actions in the 1970s with the theory of political opportunity structure made 
by Lui and Chiu (1997) has inspired this study, which focuses on the sociopolitical 
conditions facilitating the emergence of movements and the employment of civil 
                                                 
20 For example, civil disobedience, as one means of protest, has not been studied in the academic 
circle in Hong Kong.  
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disobedience as protest means. In other words, except relying on the explanation of 
the “closed political system”, would there be any other possibilities?  
In fact, there is some resemblance between the explanation (“closed political 
system”) of protest action posed by Lui and Chiu and the second condition posed by 
Rawls (normal and the legal means have been proved of “no avail”) (Rawls, 1971, p. 
110). They are guided in the same direction: the rise of protest in 1970s Hong Kong 
was forced by the closed political system - civil disobedience is more justified when 
other ways have proved of no avail. It is highly related to the openness of political or 
legal institutions.  
If we simply employed this answer to solve the question of why civil 
disobedience emerged in Hong Kong, would that be satisfactory? As one may know, 
civil disobedience has emerged in Hong Kong in different periods (e.g. 1979, 1992, 
2000 and 2005). Would the political systems in these different periods all be closed? 
Would the normal and legal means at the times above have been to no avail? The 
political systems might be, in someone’s eye, still closed – even though reforms had 
been in the pipeline. The answers, “closed political system” or “no normal ways out”, 
may always holds in those eyes of the initiators and sympathizers, but not irrefutably 
in the eyes of researchers. To explain why civil disobedience movements emerge 
from time to time, more research is needed, and this is the main task of this piece of 
study.  
1.2.4 Definition of “civil society” 
Before providing my own hypothesis, a crucial definition has to be outlined 
first. As a very crucial part of the following hypothesis and the thesis as a whole (the 
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necessary condition for the emergence of civil disobedience21), it is necessary to 
discuss the debate about the definition of civil society. 
The concept of civil society has its own developmental history. The very old 
definition (often called the original or classical definition) was provided at the time 
of Plato and Aristotle (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 84) (Ehrenberg, 1999). Under the 
heading politike koinonia (political society/community), it was defined as a “public 
ethical-political community of free and equal citizens under a legally defined system 
of rule” (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 84). However, the “rule” here does mean the 
written law or any laws in the modern sense, but the ethos - “…a common set of 
norms and values defining not only political procedures but also a substantive form 
of life based on a developed catalogue of preferred virtues…” (Cohen & Andrew, 
1992, p. 84). Also, the definition of civil society or political community here did not 
allow the “…distinction between state and society…” (Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 
84).  
The Medieval definition was that civil society (in the Christian theories) was 
politically constituted to “…serve God’s purposes…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi). It was 
“…organized around humanity’s fallen condition…” and “…emphasized 
dependence…” The major difference with the previous definition is that the medieval 
theories “…initially denied that the works of human beings could guide moral 
action…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi).  
The watershed between the traditional (classical and medieval) and the modern 
meanings of civil society were the “…development toward absolutism…” (Cohen & 
Andrew, 1992, p. 86). Thomas Hobbes, in his Leviathan, announced not only the 
                                                 
21 The reason why it is the necessary condition will be discussed further in Chapter 2.  
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constitution of sovereign power but also the civil society, as the “…artificial 
creation…” of the former (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xi). Whether civil society is created 
by state power was in question, but it was a watershed because of the distinction 
drawn between state and society. The transition had historical roots. It was 
complemented by the “…emergence of autonomous religious bodies tolerated by a 
more secular state…” and the “…rise of new forms of private economic activity…” 
(Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. 86).  
This idea was shown in Locke’s understanding of civil society, as 
“…constituted by property, production, and acquisition required by a law-governed 
state to preserve order and protect liberty…” (Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xiii). It draws the 
distinction of the state protecting one’s liberty. So, one may see that the autonomy 
enjoyed by civil society is the result of the distinction from the state.  
Emphasizing the negative liberty is in the line of liberalism. Another line of 
discussion on civil society is in the sphere of republicanism (or someone called it 
communitarianism) (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 13). It was a response towards extreme 
individualism. In Gellner’s words, the “…individualism inherent in the condition of 
modular man … was hostile to the cult of community…” (Gellner, 1995, p. 46). 
Representatives of this line of thought would be Hannah Arendt, Robert Putnam, 
Richard Sennet, Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse22, who were worried about 
the “…disintegrative effects…” that would limit the abilities of civil society 
(Ehrenberg, 1999, p. xvi) (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 14).  
                                                 
22 This simplification would not be perfect in summarizing the theories of the scholars above. 
However, this thesis will only need a working definition of civil society - describing what will be 
included in this categorization of our lives - so that the discussion will not be bogged down in too 
much detail.  
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So, after discussion of the development of the concept itself, which might be 
employed for the investigation further? Is there any “working” definition that could 
be borrowed for empirical analysis? In Cohen’s words, “civil society” can be 
understood as follows:  
“…a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the 
intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary 
associations), social movements, and forms of public communication… institutionalized and 
generalized through laws, and especially subjective rights, that stabilize social differentiation…” 
(Cohen & Andrew, 1992, p. ix). 
This working definition of civil society can be summarized into a few 
indicators: 1) autonomy from state and economy; 2) openness (above all, of the 
intimate spheres like families, which are closed); 3) with voluntary participation; 4) 
for citizens to communicate and associate. These indicators might not be perfectly 
accurate, but fair enough for scholarly investigation23.  
1.2.5 Delegitimation 
Another important building block of this thesis, the sufficient condition24, is 
constituted by one famous but controversial concept in political science, the 
legitimacy.  
                                                 
23 These indicators have been used in some scholarly investigations by local scholars in their 
explorations of civil society in Hong Kong. For example in Chan Kin-man’s Towards Civil Society (in 
Chinese).  
24 Emphasize once again, the sufficient condition proposed in this thesis cannot be examined in a 
theoretical way. It is because the sufficient condition, practically, has some kind of relationship with 
the necessary condition. In other words, the necessary condition (existence of civil society) is not only 
necessary to the emergence of civil disobedience, but also has positive relationship with the sufficient 
condition (delegitimizing effect). Although this may not be perfect in scientific investigation, this 
might be a common constraint faced by social scientists on their limited manipulability on controlling 
factors.  
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As the author of this thesis calls, delegitimizing effect as the sufficient 
condition, is the drain of legitimacy by the action or inaction of government. And 
legitimacy’s definition needs to occupy some space of this chapter.  
Legitimacy is the “recognition of the right to govern” (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10). It 
is fundamental to the ruler on which the ruler can guarantee the obedience of the 
ruled25. This recognition is constituted mainly by three elements26 in its 
contemporary sense.  
The elements proposed by David Beetham included legal validity, beliefs and 
values, and consent derived from actions expressive of it (Beetham, 1991, pp. 12-13). 
Another scholar, Jean Marc Coicaud, has shared the similar thought. Coicaud claims 
that were consent, law and  norms being constitutive of legitimacy (Coicaud, 2002, p. 
10). Coicaud also claims that the three elements are “indissociable” in reality and 
sharing a complementary relationship (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10).   
Although in Coicaud’s eye, the three elements are “indissociable”, this thesis 
would like to emphasize two of the three elements which are the beliefs and values, 
and legal validity. The first one is saying when government is doing in accordance to 
the general beliefs and values of the public, the legitimacy of her will be enhanced 
(or vice versa). The second one is saying when government is doing something in 
accordance to the higher law or constitutional law, the legitimacy of her will be 
enhanced (or vice versa).  
                                                 
25 It is undeniable that some governments in history can govern without (or with not much) legitimacy, 
but solely by coercion and fear or performance. However, this kind of government needs to live with 
caution, once the economy goes down or the police system doesn’t work, larger force is needed to 
stabilize the society.  
26 The elements contributing to legitimacy are not without controversy. The famous but old definition 
was provided by Max Weber. His taxonomy of elements were traditional, legal, and charismatic 
(Scott, 1993, p. 55). Also quoted by Ian Scott, the definition provided by David Beetham would be 
employed. 
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They are the two crucial components in the arguments brought by civil 
disobedience movements’ initiators. (For example, in the cases posed in the chapters 
3 and 4, the Basic Law are used to support their claims that government is not acting 
legally valid; or some acts of government leads people to question whether it is 
harming their freedom of speech or protest, these are the examples intruding their 
beliefs and values27) 
So, when the author of this thesis discuss in concrete examples on the 
delegitimizing effect, it is saying the legitimacy of government is being harmed, in 
the ways of either legal validity or moral authority (or both). And at the time, more 
words would be spent on the linkage between the facts or events and the harm of 
legitimacy through the above two ways. For now, an operational definition of 
legitimacy would be provided first in avoidance of endless dispute on this 
controversial concept.  
                                                 
27 These claims are largely normative. They are always “just” versus “unjust” or “good” versus “evil”. 
It would be more easily understood that the complex legal argument, so it is more common. But 
importantly, these normative claims are backed up by the beliefs in rights or freedom, or linked to 
their belief in morality.  
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1.3 Summary 
We can see that the above discussion is largely separated into three parts. The 
first is the major debates on “what is civil disobedience” and its justification28. The 
second is on the study of social movements in Hong Kong and the related social 
movement theories. The last part is the definition of civil society and legitimacy.  
The first part will be useful for the discussion later, on distinguishing what 
should be counted as civil disobedience and what shouldn’t. The discussion on 
justifiability can show the distance between ideas and actions because the 
justification can only provide grounds for the emergence of civil disobedience 
movement, but not explaining its emergence. In other words, this part has shown the 
limited exploration on the same topic.  
The second part explores what studies concerning social movements in Hong 
Kong have been done. Although they were not directly aiming at the emergence of 
civil disobedience, they have provided important insights to this study. Mainly, they 
have separated their studies by different types of social movements - the means has 
rarely been the question and there has been no need to discuss it with regard to civil 
disobedience. However, the study of Lui and Chiu (1997) has provided an important 
insight to this study. Their explanation on the emergence of protest actions in 1970s 
and their decline in 1980s with the increasing openness of the political system has 
inspired this study to understand emergence of civil disobedience movement in the 
light of cost/benefit analysis, in relation to the larger sociopolitical condition.  
So, the author would like to show the limited investigation on the question 
posed with the first two parts of literature review. The third part helps to give us a 
                                                 
28 Its purpose, nonviolence, and being punished or not affect the justifiability morally, legally or 
politically.  
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primary idea of what civil society is, which is very important building block when 
explaining why civil disobedience emerges (this will be discussed in detail in chapter 
2). Another building block, the sufficient condition, is composed by the widespread 
concept legitimacy. This has been discussed in the third part also.  
So, it has been shown that this study’s focus has not been comprehensively 
discussed by the scholars whose works have just been examined.  The centrality of 
the research question “why civil disobedience as a political phenomenon emerges” 
has been neglected by these scholars. However, the hypothesis of this study is 
inspired by the studies mentioned above. It will now come to more detailed 
discussion on the methodology used in answering the question.  
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1.4 Methodology 
Due to the limited exploration by political scientists (and the even more limited 
exploration in the context of Hong Kong) on this topic, the history of Nazi Germany 
and India will be studied within the framework of the topic of civil disobedience in 
chapter 2. This will lead to a hypothesis being drawn that will be tested in chapters 3 
and 4, with the data having been collected in Hong Kong. The data used for testing 
the hypothesis is from semi-structured interviews with dissenters who have launched 
civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. The aim of this study is to find out 
under what sociopolitical conditions the dissenters perceived the legal, normal access 
no longer useful and under what sociopolitical conditions they decided to launch 
civil disobedience movements. While this hypothesis will not aim to provide an 
explanation for the civil disobedience movements of the whole world, it will at least 
provide a refutable hypothesis in the field of Hong Kong Studies. The detailed 
discussion of the insights gained and contribution will be reserved to the last chapter.  
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Chapter 2 Hypothesis Building: the case of the White Rose 
in Nazi Germany and the case of India 
Due to the limited study done on the specific question of this thesis, this study 
cannot act as a revision to previous theories, but has to build a new theory to 
understand the question posed. For what reasons, have civil disobedience movements 
emerged in Hong Kong?  
It then comes to the question of empirical observation in reality, but not 
abstract debate on the nature of what civil disobedience as a concept is (which is 
provided in chapter 1). So, what would civil disobedience movements be practically? 
It comes down to the problem of significance. As a pioneer, Hannah Arendt posed 
this question to those philosophers of her time and she claimed this problem is 
“…seldom admitted…” She brought the number of participants into consideration 
(Arendt, 1972, p. 55).  
This is impossible to be missed when we have to conduct an empirical study on 
civil disobedience movements. It would be a process or consequence in which people 
being convinced by the initiator(s) to participate in the nonviolent and illegal actions. 
It would be a transmission from the conscience of the initiators to that of the 
sympathizers. And civil disobedience carried out by only one or a few can be ignored 
if we want to observe those civil disobedience movements with political impact.29  
On explaining the emergence of significant civil disobedience, Arendt (1972, p. 
74) has provided one more insight that builds on the similar insight posed by Rawls 
before (no normal channels). Civil disobedience is not only the last resort, but also a 
                                                 
29 And, also, that is too hard to observe. In Arendt’s words, civil disobedience practiced by a single 
individual is rather eccentric and not significant enough to be suppressed (Arendt, 1972, p. 55). 
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weapon exposing the weakness of government when “…legality and constitutionality 
are open to grave doubt…” In other words, it is used not because there is no options 
left, but because it would expose the weakness of government. It is chosen 
intentionally at the right time. 
This was a new insight into the exploration of sociopolitical conditions. Except 
explaining the emergence of civil disobedience as a last resort (which is easily 
subjected to question, as shown in chapter 1), we can now also focus on the 
sociopolitical conditions favoring the act, under which the means is employed 
deliberately.  
When we come to discuss a pre-existing condition, it can be distinguished into 
two types, necessary and sufficient. Due to the lack of similar studies focusing on 
Hong Kong, the author of this study has had to borrow insights from foreign cases. 
The discussion on the White Rose in Nazi Germany is concerned with the necessary 
condition, and later on with the sufficient condition – borrowing the example of the 
Salt March in India. 
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2.1 On Necessary Condition: the case of the White Rose 
We cannot observe civil disobedience movements emerged in Nazi Germany, 
but there were resisting acts very similar to civil disobedience. However, due to the 
constraint of environment, it was not possible to evolve these acts into full civil 
disobedience movements.  
Before going deep into the discussion of the environmental constraints and the 
necessary condition, a brief historical background should be provided. What had 
been done by the White Rose? It was an organization formed by close friends. The 
most well-known members were Hans Scholl and Sophie Scholl30. From the point 
they decided to act to their deaths, there was a period of eight months only (Scholl, 
1970). 
What had been done that cost their lives? At the very beginning, they were just 
gathering for the study of literature and history. Although there were books banned, 
their acts were by no means contentious, not to mention civilly disobedient. Their 
acts turned overtly political in June 1942. They decided to distribute leaflets that 
raised the awareness of the Germans31 that their responsibility was to oppose the evil 
regime lest “…shame… befall us and our children…” as a “…member of Christian 
and Western civilization…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 74).  
They distributed six leaflets in total. The leaflets were not only designed to 
convince the people that the regime was evil, but also asked them to act and to pose 
resistance to the “…war machine…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 83). Although sabotage, in 
                                                 
30 The story of these siblings has been filmed and documented. Some examples are: Sophie Scholl: 
The Final Days (film), Sophie Scholl: The Real Story of the Woman who Defied Hitler (book) and The 
White Rose – Munich 1942-1943 (book).  
31 Some say different leaflets out of the six in total were aimed at different groups of audience. 
Petrescu (2010, p. 147) claimed that first four were addressed to the “intellectual” 
(Bildungsbourgeoisie) who was trusted to have more “political responsibility to take up 
responsibility”. And the last two were aimed at the general public.  
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some eyes, may be violent, the actions that they called for were largely nonviolent 
(they called it passive resistance) (Scholl, 1970, pp. 82-83).  
At the time, the “public realm” was dictated by party propaganda - there was 
no space for autonomous discussion or open criticism (Petrescu, 2010, p. 3). What 
they were doing was illegal for sure. Their call was from their conscience and 
heavily related to morality and religion. They accused the regime of being the 
murderer of the three hundred thousand Jews and accused the readers of continuing 
to “…slumber on in their dull, stupid sleep…”, further challenging the reader that 
they “…have sunk into a fatal consciencelessness…” (Scholl, 1970, p. 79).  
What they had done fulfilled the combined definition of civil disobedience 
(illegal, nonviolent, conscientious and moral education) except with respect to one 
point: publicness.  
Under totalitarianism32, one may need to strive to not to be labeled as a 
“…saboteur, a Trotskyite, a foreign spy, or a Fascist…” (Arendt, 1958, p. 323). It is 
extremely costly to act according to one’s conscience. It may cost not only your own 
life, but the lives of your wife, children and your mere acquaintances. If one is bold 
enough to act according to your conscience (like the members of the White Rose), it 
would be hard to guarantee that the people around you would not act as a 
whistleblower to safeguard their own family. It is the choice between “…murder and 
murder…” mentioned by Arendt (Arendt, 1958, p. 452).  
So, even if one dares to do something illegal publicly, the people around the 
actor might very well report to the secret police as soon as possible to avoid being 
accused of collusion. This was exactly the fate of Hans and Sophie. When they were 
                                                 
32 Society under such a regime is “…mass atomized…” (Arendt, 1958, p. 323) and run through with 
terror. You will never know who among you might be secret police.  
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distributing their last leaflet at the University of Munich on 18 Feb 1943, they were 
spotted and were reported to the Gestapo (Scholl, 1970, p. 52). That kind of 
environment would hinder the emergence of civil disobedience, as a public act, in 
two senses.  
Firstly, for the initiators, it means that it is with extremely high cost to launch 
civil disobedience movement as a process of moral education. This process may take 
time and, in the meantime, your lives might be forfeited before any significant 
political impact is caused. If one really dares to go against the regime, one might 
choose the means more likely to succeed and take less time, in other words, 
revolutionary, rather than appealing to another’s conscience and longing for their 
response.  
Secondly, for the sympathizers, it might also involve an extremely high cost to 
participate in civil disobedience movements. You might never know who around you 
could be secret police or a spy. Also, in a society where the media is totally 
controlled for party propaganda, the information of civil disobedience might be hard, 
if not impossible, to spread.  
If someone is dare enough to overcome the cost (his/her life) to educate others 
the evilness of the regime, and if someone is luckily enough to receive the 
information and follow the acts, the civil disobedience movement is hardly to be 
significant. The only result for the conscientious acts under totalitarianism would be 
insignificant or eccentric, rather than politically significant. The reason lies with the 
lack of civil society, as a public space in which freedom of speech protected by law.  
If we borrow varied definitions of civil society (for example, political 
society/community in Aristotle’s epoch or civil society in Locke’s understanding), the 
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public space has to be protected by a certain system of “rule”33. In the contemporary 
sense, freedom of speech has to be protected by law (like constitution) and based on 
that, civil society can be built upon. An easy measurement would be the free press34, 
which is the backbone of civil society. It is because with the free press, public space 
can be reserved for the discussion of political matters35, evaluation or even criticism 
on performance of leaders. These critical comments may not only be shown on 
papers, but also in real actions, for instance protest.  
So, if people are agitated (like by the performance of the political leaders), 
people can gather and air their grievance. In this sense, the freedom of association36 
is closed linked to the freedom of speech preceding. If this grievance is long-lasting, 
organizations may be formed to voice and propose in a continual way. Finally, if 
political system has opened, some organizations may form political party further to 
be the surgeon of society themselves.  
These requirement should be too far from the situation in Nazi Germany. It is 
even questionable whether the first step is met. It is because freedom of speech 
would cost your lives.  
The author would like stress that civil society would have its own pace of 
development. Freedom of speech guaranteed by law would be the starting point, but 
                                                 
33 No matter written law or unwritten or just a general understanding of virtue.  
34 Free press here would not means autonomous from anything, for instance the market. Free press 
here just means autonomous from the government.  
35 Although one may criticize the level of participation of a laymen in the discussion (especially the 
media company is a big one), he/she can still choose another media report. This can be regarded as a 
participation though the passages are not written by them.  
36 Audience may question whether freedom of association exist when we come across the 1979 Yau 
Ma Tei Boat People Incident. In that case, the targeted law to be challenged is exactly the law 
restricting the freedom of association (certain number of people were not allowed to gather). However, 
does it mean freedom of association was not existing at the time? The answer is no, because before the 
Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident turned into civil disobedience movement, people can gather 
collectively to protest without being charged by the law. It was because the arbitrary law was not 
implemented by the police in most of the time. The freedom of association was then not seriously 
weakened, as if the case in Nazi Germany. (Further discussion would be left to the Section 5.2) 
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author would not regard this to be the necessary condition because civil disobedience 
movements are still hard to be launched when individuals have their freedom to 
speak, but no chance to communicate with others in the society. (Or they cannot get 
known to other’s ideas, whether they share the same idea with me) And if people can 
communicate and exchange their ideas on politics, they may commit into collective 
action, as a platform to show their similar political ideas and claims. Freedom of 
association is then inherited or closed linked to the freedom of speech.  
As the audience may notice, the above definition of civil society is not an 
absolute concept. The existence of civil society can be a relative concept instead, in 
which civil society is not developed once and for all. So, the author would like to 
propose a developing civil society (or quasi-civil society) to be the necessary 
condition. “Quasi-civil society” means free press could exist to represent some 
voices in the society37 and people can get known to other’s idea from there and act 
collectively. The free press can then exist as a public realm in which freedom of 
speech is shown and where the common thought is germinated.  
In this vein, if one has to launch civil disobedience movement, the existence of 
a quasi-civil society in which the freedom of speech and certain level of freedom of 
association is protected would be a necessary condition. In the case of Nazi Germany 
where the public realm was reserved solely for the party propaganda and the law (no 
need to mention public collective movement) was just an instrument of the ruler, 
civil disobedience movements was just impossible to be launched - even though 
there were actors willing to sacrifice their lives for conscience and truth. 
                                                 
37 Quasi- here means half-developed. The author would regard people participate voluntarily in 
politics (like run for election) to be a milestone for mature civil society. So, when people receive 
frequently other’s idea from the free press would be in the half way of development.  
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2.2 On Sufficient Condition: the case of India 
Mahatma Gandhi is well-known for his leadership in civil disobedience (or 
Satyagraha – truth-force) as a special means of protest. His philosophy has been the 
main focus when one mentions Mahatma Gandhi. However, the sociopolitical 
conditions underlining his civil disobedience movements have not been systematized 
with reference to the study of civil disobedience. This section will focus on the 
sufficient condition38 of the movement(s).  
In the 1920s and 1930s, Gandhi had made two attempts with his special protest 
means - civil disobedience. The first wave was following the non-cooperation 
movement39 in 1920. The non-cooperation movement intensified in those years and 
Gandhi agitated the public to escalate their movements into refusal to join military 
service and refusal to pay tax, which is in fact civil disobedience (Ng, 1981, pp. 291-
292). However, this wave of civil disobedience movement had not been successfully 
launched due to the outbreak of violence in the fall of 1921. He was forced to call off 
the campaign (Spear, 1966, p. 191). Imprisonment then followed in 1922 (Ng, 1981, 
p. 292).  
The second wave was not started immediately after his release from prison in 
1924, but in 1930 by way of the famous Salt March. Throughout the gap years, he 
was fighting for the emancipation of the lowest caste, “Untouchable”, in the caste 
system. The caste was then christened as the “Sons of God” or the Harijans (Spear, 
                                                 
38 Audience please note that “sufficient condition” here cannot be examined philosophically (e.g. A  
B; A cause B), because in the discussion of sufficient condition for emergence of civil disobedience 
movements in India, the necessary condition (quasi-civil society) was existing. The evidence is 
Gandhi could continually publicize articles in the leading papers both in England and India, for 
generating sympathy (Rynne, 2008). Also, he could air his opinion through speeches throughout the 
country and through his weekly papers like Young India which lasted for more than ten years. These 
conditions cannot be controlled and taken away.  
39 It included officials’ resignations, withdrawal from government schools, and a voters’ boycott 
(Spear, 1966, p. 191).  
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1966, p. 195). He publicized his ideas (ashima – nonviolence, satyagraha – truth-
force) in his weekly paper, the Young India40, and this paper was read “…more 
avidly than any debates in the legislative assemblies…” (Spear, 1966, p. 195).  
In the eyes of analysts, he was preparing or waiting for the chance to launch a 
second wave of civil disobedience.41 And, in fact, if the Indian was fighting for the 
rights of independence on the one hand, and keeping the unequal caste system on the 
other, that would greatly harm the justifiability of that stance. So, the postponed 
launch of civil disobedience movement was not without reason from the perspective 
of justifiability. The discussion of sufficient conditions before the launch of the two 
waves of civil disobedience movements are in the followings: 
 The civil disobedience movements were a part of the Indian independence 
movement. As an important watershed of the nationalistic movement, World War I 
(WWI) serves as the starting point of a brief discussion about the sufficient 
conditions. The nationalistic sentiment had been greatly accelerated by WWI for the 
perceived lack of reward for the great contribution of Indian in the war.42 The 
performance of Indian soldiers “…took the world by surprise…” and “…thrilled 
every British heart…” (Keay, 2000, p. 470). However, the great performance had not 
                                                 
40 This was an influential weekly paper lasting for more than ten years, from 1919 to 1931 (Gandhi, 
1922). This is an evidence to the claim that “quasi-civil society” was existing in India at the time, 
when Gandhi can publish his ideas through this weekly journal and which has been read avidly. (See 
Footnote 46 for detail) 
41 Spear claimed that Gandhi was in his “side-wings” “waiting for the political wind to change” (Spear, 
1966, p. 195) 
42 There was more than two million Indian serving overseas (Keay, 2000, p. 470). And the 
contribution of Indian soldiers was commented as “What an army!” by the press New York World 
(Wolpert, 2009, p. 302) 
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been rewarded in accordance with the demands of the Indians43 and did not satisfy 
the nationalist sentiments of the time44.  
Aside from the limited rewards, severe punishment had been received by the 
Indians. For a replacement of wartime law, Mr. Justice Rowlatt had been appointed 
to propose new bills. The Rowlatt bills allowed “…judges to try political cases 
without juries…” and power of internment without trial was accorded to provincial 
governments (Spear, 1966, p. 190).  
Not only were civil rights being harmed, but lives were lost in the same year. 
In April 1919, the “pig-headed” Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer marched into a 
traditional ceremony with his forces, and shot without warning until their 
ammunition was used up. Over 1200 men, women and children were wounded and 
379 died under his command - without martial rule imposed (Keay, 2000, p. 476).  
One can see that, the grievance of Indians agitated by the “rewards” of the 
WWI was not enough to explain the emergence of civil disobedience45, but the 
existence of laws and acts severely harming the moral or constitutional ground of the 
establishment. Then, the initiator (this time, Gandhi) was able to urge the public not 
to cooperate with the “satanic” or “sinful” government (Spear, 1966, p. 190). This 
was not just a coincidence.  
                                                 
43 The demands held by the “Extremists”, Tilak and Mrs. Besant, as the leaders of the Home Rule 
Leagues was the right to “home-rule” (Spear, 1966, p. 189). That was not totally independence from 
the Empire, but rule by their own ethnicity within the Empire (Ng, 1981, p. 260). 
44 There was a reform called the Montagu-Chelmsford report which served as the blueprint for the 
next thirty years and it would be a “friendly independence” (Spear, 1966, p. 185). Also, the devolution 
of power from the center to the provinces paved the way to “federalism” and a new franchise was 
brought into the legislative elections. However, the expectation of Indians was far more than that 
(Spear, 1966, p. 185). 
45 It was the old explanation of social movement by the Classical school of social movement, inherited 
from social psychology.  
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One may argue that the decision made by the initiator is proactive, especially 
by way of the means and way of protest. It is right that the initiator may have room to 
choose what is to be done, like sit-ins, non-cooperation or even illegal protests. 
However, there should be some sociopolitical conditions underlining the decisions 
made, which facilitate or even make it possible. In this case, the Rowlatt bills and the 
massacre led by Dyer had greatly harmed the moral authority or “moral pretentions” 
of the British (Keay, 2000, p. 476). This harm on moral authority would cause a 
delegitimation on the government. This pre-conditioned46 the launch of actions like 
refusal of military service and paying tax, which were illegal.  
We can examine the sufficient condition of the Salt March, to see if the above 
explanation is refuted or not.  
As mentioned before, civil disobedience had not been launched immediately 
after Gandhi’s release from prison. He had been “waiting for the political wind to 
change” (Spear, 1966, p. 195). What constituted that wind to be changed?  
After the Montagu-Chelmsford Reform pushed by British in 1919, there was a 
ten year internal inquest to reveal any progress. To that end, a commission was 
formed, led by Sir John Simon. The Simon Commission was full of Britons; the 
report they made was sure in recommending no changes in the central government 
and without any word on the complete independence demanded by the Indian.47 This 
                                                 
46 Specifically speaking, the massacre led by General Dyer can show that the necessary condition 
cannot be “controlled” like what natural scientists done in laboratory. It is because in the Young India 
(1922, v4), Gandhi has accused the government for her wrong-doing. He wrote: “The Government 
have been guilty of not coming up to the standard of right-doing which was expected by the people in 
the matter of the Punjab and the Khilafat.” The matter of the Punjab is trusted to be the massacre 
which was located in a city called Amritsar within the state Punjab.  
47 This was demanded in the All Parties Convention and by a constitutional report prepared by Motilal 
Nehru, leader of Indian National Congress (Keay, 2000, p. 486). 
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was like a break of promises made in their eyes. It was with this pre-condition, the 
Salt March was launched in 1930.  
To sum up, the Rowlatt Bills, the Massacre led by General Dyer and the report 
of Simon Commission share the same characteristics. They harmed the moral ground 
and the constitutional ground of the establishment. This is what the author of this 
thesis called delegitimizing effect.  
The Rowlatt Bills had greatly shrunk the civil rights of the citizens to be judged 
fairly and it was seen as an insult to Indians. Keay comments that:  
“…(the Rowlatt bills) belied the spirit of the imminent reforms, it insulted a people who had 
lately made such heavy sacrifices for the empire, and it foreshadowed British readiness to resort 
to further repression…” (2000, p. 474). 
The Massacre led by General Dyer was even more questionable for its moral 
and constitutional grounds. Lacking the support of martial law, there was no legal 
excuse for it. Keay comments that even with the martial law, “Dyer’s conduct would 
have been indefensible under any military code…” (Keay, 2000, p. 476). 
The report made by the Simon Commission also suffered from the problem of 
lack of moral and legal grounds. It was because that it was just the further 
investigation on the progress promised by the previous reform. The result of no 
change was not acceptable in the eyes of Indians even in 1919, let alone in 1928 
when their demands were escalated.  
It was under these kinds of sufficient condition that the civil disobedience 
movements happened. Although the decision to employ the means is always in the 
hands of initiators, the sufficient condition drawing the decision matters. And for the 
convenience of later discussion, these kinds of sufficient condition can be framed 
  
 
40 
 
under the delegitimizing effect, under which “…legality and constitutionality are 
open to grave doubt…” (Arendt, 1972, p. 74). 
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2.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the hypothesis, with its components (necessary condition and 
sufficient condition), has been outlined. Due to the lack of previous studies, the 
hypothesis has had to be invented and tested against foreign experience, rather than 
studies in Hong Kong. Limited by the length of this study, the history of the Nazi 
Germany and India cannot be paved in as much detail as possible, but the author has 
tried hard to outline the parts related to the hypothesis building. The hypothesis built 
in this chapter will be examined with cases in Hong Kong. The data for case studies 
has been collected from semi-structured interviews, especially explanations of the 
emergence of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. The hypothesis on the 
emergence of civil disobedience is going to be examined as follows:  
Necessary Condition: Existence of civil society (quasi-civil society as well) in 
which freedom of speech is protected by law 
Sufficient Condition: the Delegitimizing Effect 
Hypothesis: If civil society exists in Hong Kong, delegitimizing effects then 
lead civil disobedience movements to emerge.  
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Chapter 3 Citizens’ Radio Incident 
This chapter aims to explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, as 
one case of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. From that, the hypothesis 
generated previously can be examined with the empirical data found.   
This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will tackle the nature 
of the Citizens’ Radio Incident and whether it is civil disobedience from an academic 
perspective. The latter part will elaborate on the reasons for the emergence of the 
Citizens’ Radio Incident.  
3.1 Nature of the Citizens’ Radio Incident 
Before we examine the question of why it happened, we have to know whether 
the Citizen’s Radio Incident suits our definition of civil disobedience. The discussion 
focuses on whether the movements launched by the social activists or the pro-
democracy politicians fitted the mold provided to us by the founding theorists.  
As previously mentioned in this thesis (the end of Section 1.2.1), this master 
thesis chooses the comprehensive definition of civil disobedience as a threshold: 
“…illegally, publicly, nonviolently, and conscientiously with the intent to frustrate (one of) the 
laws, policies, or decisions of his government…” (Bedau, 1961, p. 661) 
“…educate the public what is ‘right’…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 7)  
 With this comprehensive version of definitions, we can now assess the 
Citizens’ Radio Incident to see whether or not it was a civil disobedience from an 
academic perspective.48  
                                                 
48 The problem of significant or not is suffering from some subjectivity, one may just think they are 
eccentric. However, from the list of the guests who have been there, it is for sure significant. It is 
  
 
43 
 
3.1.1 Illegality, publicness and conscientiousness/specified purposes 
Participating in a civil disobedience movement is illegal. Illegality is to violate 
the law by acting or not acting accordingly. However, participating in civil 
disobedience is not equal to law-breaking generally. Law-breaking behavior can be 
done out of different motivations. The participants of civil disobedience have to 
follow certain restrictions on the purpose of their breaking of a law, to distinguish 
themselves from other law-breakers like criminals. So, under what purpose(s), can 
participants of civil disobedience be distinct from other criminals? 
In the minimalist definition above, civil disobedience must be conscientiously 
with the intent to frustrate (one of) the laws, policies, or decisions of the government 
(Bedau, 1961, p. 661). And, in the maximalist definition, the requirements around the 
purpose are also higher. The civil disobedience as a means of protest “…must be 
viewed as an exercise in public moral education, as a tactic to achieve law reform…” 
(Bedau, 1991, p. 7). So, the purpose of civil disobedience is to change the unjust law 
or to educate or awaken an indifferent public to the imperatives of the issue.  
The purpose is then highly related to another element, the publicness. You have 
to let others know - or even let the government know what you are doing – and, 
through the acts, you have to persuade them that you are in the right side. Especially 
if you are doing something illegal, you have to convince the public by doing that 
openly, being willing to accept criticism and being ready for discussion (and 
normally ready for bearing the cost of law-breaking). That’s the process of moral 
education.  
                                                                                                                                          
because there have been many celebrities, pre- and current legislative councilors who have been their 
guest. One can see the table “Summary of Citizens’ Radio Incident” for more detail.  
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Before examining the purpose of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, the behavior of 
the participants should be first gone through, to see if it was illegal and public. The 
participants of the Citizens’ Radio Incident have largely been included in the 
following behaviors: possessing the equipment for radio broadcasting, setting up the 
equipment for radio broadcasting, broadcasting and being a guest in the programs. 
Except being a guest, the above acts are illegal under the Telecommunications 
Ordinance. According to the Section (8)(1) of the Telecommunication Ordinance, no 
person shall: 
(a) Establish or maintain any means of telecommunications; or 
(aa) offer in the course of business a telecommunications service; or  
(b) Possess or use any apparatus for radio communications or any apparatus of any kind that 
generates and emits radio waves notwithstanding that the apparatus is not intended for 
radio communications; or  
(c) Deal in the course of trade or business in apparatus or material for radio communications 
or in any component part of any such apparatus or in apparatus of any kind that generates 
and emits radio waves whether or not the apparatus is intended, or capable of being used, 
for radio communications; or  
(d) Demonstrate, with a view to sale in the course of trade or business, any apparatus or 
material for radio communications. (Department of Justice, 2012) 
All of the above acts are not allowed except when a license is “…granted by 
the Governor in Council or with the appropriate license granted or created by the 
Authority…” (Department of Justice, 2012). So, the acts of possessing any apparatus 
for radio broadcasting, setting up and broadcasting (or emitting the radio waves) are 
illegal under this law.  
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The acts should be first counted as illegal for the act to be civil disobedience. 
However, what’s worth mentioning is that, when the author conducted interviews 
with the participants, the point of “illegality” was not directly admitted. Here is the 
direct quotation of the interview49:  
“Interviewer: So, do you have any definition for civil disobedience? 
Interviewee: I don’t have. No definition indeed, but real civil disobedience is ‘when you are 
not satisfied with the present institution or law, you have to think of a way, to challenge. And 
when you are trying to challenge that, continuously, you are doing so. 
Interviewer: Continuously violate the law? 
Interviewee: No, it is continuously walking a fine line50. Then, you are doing (real) civil 
disobedience” (Tsang, 2013) 
Maybe the reason why interviewee disagreed the acts as illegal is they disagree 
with the law. From the above text, “taking part in civil disobedience which was 
illegal” has not been directly admitted by Tsang. But rather he used a phrase which is 
much vaguer, “walking a fine line”. The author does not want to guess the intention 
behind this difference but rather focus on the acts. The author would point to the fact 
that the Citizens’ Radio was an illegal act before the judicial branch abolishes the 
law.  
Then, the next question would be if that the act was “public”. As discussed in 
Section 2.3.1, there are two ways to understand the word “public”. First of all, an act 
should be related to some public values and public life. Secondly, it should be 
established whether the act was carried out openly or done secretly. In this respect, 
                                                 
49 From my interview conducted in Chinese, with Tsang Kin-shing on 16th October, 2013. 
50 The words used by Tsang were “踩鋼線”. The translation above may not be perfectly accurate. But 
the phrase is learnt from http://paper.wenweipo.com/2012/03/30/ED1203300029.htm.  
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the statement of the Citizens’ Radio has a clear stance. It was aiming at freedom of 
speech, which is a public value we treasure (The Citizens' Radio, 2006). Also, the 
intention to launch civil disobedience had been clearly stated in the newspapers even 
before Tsang went to submit the application to the authority - obviously not a secret 
(Sing Tao Daily, 2005) 
So, we come to an important distinction of civil disobedience - the purpose. 
The purpose of the law-breaking act is crucial to justifying the acts or even when 
making a claim that a civil disobedience movement is being performed. The author 
admits that there may be no universal agreement on the definition of civil 
disobedience, so the purpose is important element to convince others your 
disobedience is civil. And for a civil disobedience to be justified, the purpose should 
not be that of private interest or at least not be presented as that of private interest.  
What was the purpose of the Citizens’ Radio incident? We can first examine 
the content of their stance statement. In the statement, it was put that the aim of their 
act was to strike for “…freedom of speech…” (The Citizens' Radio, 2006). In my 
interview with the Director, Tsang Kin-shing, there is more elaboration:  
“Every day’s broadcast is challenging the law.” 
Also from the quotation before: 
“… real civil disobedience is ‘when you are not satisfied with the present institution or law, you 
have to think of a way, to challenge. …” 
So, according to Tsang, the aim of setting up the Citizens’ Radio was to 
challenge the law or present institutions (Tsang, 2013). In fact, this aim has a little bit 
divergence with the definition posed by Bedau. This is because, according to the 
minimalist definition, it should be the law, policy or a decision made by the 
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government that is to be challenged. However, Tsang was not only aiming at the law 
but also the licensing institution. This viewpoint is not only shared by one participant.  
In the author’s interview with Legislator Leung Kwok-hung, a similar 
viewpoint has been expressed: 
“Interviewee: We think that the Telecommunication Ordinance is wrong and we knew that we 
have to apply for a license. But we deliberately broadcast without a license, and let them sue 
us. … 
Interviewer: Your aim is to change the law? 
Interviewee: To change the institution.” (Leung K.-h. , 2013) 
The aim, to change the institution, is not included in the definition of Bedau. 
But does this mean that the acts above were not civil disobedience, or can the 
definition of civil disobedience be changed to include the aim “to change the 
institution”? This thesis would incline towards the view of regarding the acts of the 
participants of the Citizens’ Radio as civil disobedience. This stance can be 
explained below.  
The law related to telecommunications quoted above included a premise. When 
a license was “…granted by the Governor in Council or with the appropriate license 
granted or created by the Authority…”, the broadcast made with that apparatus was 
not illegal (Department of Justice, 2012). So, in fact, the institution for license 
granting is included as part of the law. To change the institution for license granting 
is in fact changing the law.  
Also, the “institution” they aim at is not government as a whole. (But if so, 
that’s certainly a revolution, not a civil disobedience movement) So, the author of 
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this thesis would claim the above acts still falling within the theoretical framework 
built.  
Although the aim shared by the participants is not exactly the same with the 
requirement of the minimalist definition, we find a strong moral judgment in their 
words. What they were doing was for moral education - the language of “right or 
wrong” had been employed by the activists. For example, in my interview with 
Leung Kwok-hung, he claimed:  
“We think that the Telecommunication Ordinance is wrong…” 
“The way to do civil disobedience is to reject an unreasonable ordinance, to oppose a nonsense 
institution or a nonsense police order” (Leung K.-h. , 2013) 
So, after examining the legality, publicness and the purpose of the incident, we 
can claim that it does fit our comprehensive definition of civil disobedience. The 
next section will cover the remaining element - nonviolence.  
3.1.2 Nonviolence 
The criterion, to be nonviolent, is easy to claim but hard to evaluate. The 
problem is “what act(s) should be counted as nonviolent and what shouldn’t”. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the element nonviolence itself controversial. Morreall 
challenged the concept of nonviolence by stating that “…there are many acts of 
violence done to people in which no physical contact is ever made…” (Morreall, 
1976). In other words, whether only physical harm should be counted as violence is 
the point to grapple with. And if not only physical harm should be counted as 
violence, what more? 
Morreall added that violence may be the violation of man’s rights to ‘life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and that’s why harm to one’s property and 
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psychological harm should also be counted (Morreall, 1976). Excepting the 
viewpoint of pacifists,51 “…most of the philosophers who have written on the subject, 
[accept that] the decision whether to act violently emerges as a tactical, not a 
principled, matter…” (Bedau, 1991, p. 8). So, it is possible for us to consider the 
problem of nonviolence from a tactical perspective, rather than from a principled 
perspective.  
If we follow the tactical perspective, whether a movement, or its “final 
expression”,52 is presented as nonviolent is the salient question. In this vein, the 
Citizens’ Radio Incident is nonviolent because what they have been doing is to 
broadcast in the air, using 102.8FM to launch their civil disobedience movement 
(The Citizens' Radio, 2006). It is quite hard for us to link this act with violence - if 
violence is strictly defined as to physically harm somebody. However, for the sake of 
precision, the author is obliged to show the complexity of the issue. So, in another 
vein, we might mention that 102.8FM is occupied (or assigned by government) by 
another radio broadcasting station, Metro Broadcasting Corporation Limited (Hong 
Kong Economic Journal, 2005). Also, there is some debate as to whether the act of 
occupying the frequency might endanger the take-off and landing of airplanes (Ta 
Kung Pao, 2008). So, if we follow the strictest sense of nonviolence, the Citizens’ 
Radio Incident should be counted as violent. However, the author of this thesis 
would rather be lenient and follow the common definition of violence, which is to do 
physical harm. So, the author would regard the movement as a nonviolent initiative.  
                                                 
51 It is debatable to use ‘pacifist’ to describe Mahatma Gandhi. As shown in George Orwell’s 
Reflections on Gandhi, the “anti-humanist tendency” of Gandhi’s belief is incompatible with that of 
the Western pacifists (Orwell, 1961, p. 454).  
52 See Chapter 1 (Section 1.2.1), from (Rawls, 1971, p. 106) 
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To enhance the solidarity of this claim, the interviews tested whether the social 
activists launching the movement followed the notion of nonviolence. A veteran 
social activist, Tsang Kin-shing emphasized in the interview:  
“Civil disobedience is not to hurt another physically… I have to clarify that the League of 
Social Democrats (LSD) has no inclination to violence. … It is we that suffered more from 
violence - rather than acting that on others.” (Tsang, 2013)53 
It is clear that Tsang, the Director of the Citizens’ Radio, clearly knows the 
importance of nonviolence in launching a civil disobedience movement. As he 
defined nonviolence as “not to hurt another physically”, we can see the intention 
upon launching the civil disobedience movement was not to harm others physically 
(Tsang, 2013). At the very least, the movement itself and the intentions of the 
movement leaders were not violent.  
The theoretical complexity of nonviolence has been shown before but, in 
practice, it is also difficult to stand firm on not being violent.  
Another experienced activist, Lau San-ching54 claimed:  
“Nonviolence… practically speaking is to not to harm the opposite side, just like not to throw 
petrol bomb, not to throw stone… But when you slide on the track of train, police has to come 
to remove you. At this moment, there must be physical conflict, which is unavoidable. … 
When you are doing civil disobedience, you have to disobey his command. So, you won’t leave 
actively, he/she is forced to remove you. … But in Hong Kong, some may regard sitting on 
street or even to have that kind of physical conflict with police, as a kind of violence.” (Lau S.-
c. , 2013)55 
                                                 
53 Author’s interview conducted in Chinese, with Tsang Kin-shing on 16th October, 2013.  
54 He returned to the Mainland in 1981, to try and save the democratic activist, Wang Xi-zhe. He 
failed and was sentenced to ten years. He came back to Hong Kong in 1991 (Hong Kong Economic 
Journal, 2009).  
55 Author’s interview conducted in Chinese, with Lau San-ching on 24th October, 2013. 
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As shown in the above text, Lau claimed that, in practice, those performing 
civil disobedience movement cannot avoid being accused of violence. The final 
impression is not a business initiators can fully control. Even if you don’t throw 
petrol bombs or throw stones, you may just decide to occupy train tracks. The police 
may command you to leave, you might disobey their order and then they would have 
to remove you. In the process of removal, you might try to stop the process or avoid 
pain by struggling. Police may be hurt by you through this action. Then, in some 
eyes, that may also be seen as violent.  
However, in the author’s view, it seems to be too strict to claim that the people 
sitting on tracks and waiting for removal are violent. So, although the above 
quotation may show Lau’s real life experience, it is hard to classify such acts as 
violent if we hold to our standard of violence as harming someone physically. Maybe 
we have to consider the intention further, but that might be too much. We can stick to 
the “final expression” of the whole movement as the key pointer as to whether it is 
violent.  
So, no matter whether considered in theory or in practice, nonviolence is a 
slippery concept. The standard is controversial. The participants of civil disobedience 
movement can just keep their behavior as nonviolent as possible (let’s say to not 
harm somebody physically), and let the audience decide whether they are or not. This 
is related to our discussion on “final expression”. 
Nonviolence is still one of the criteria to be assessed for a movement to be 
claimed as civil disobedience. The debate is just about whether it is finally expressed 
as nonviolent. That is partly a function of the media coverage and which sides of the 
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arguments have been presented to the public.56 There are more factors affecting the 
final expression but, largely speaking, civil disobedience movement has to be 
nonviolent. In this regard, the author of this thesis would incline to the view that the 
Citizens’ Radio Incident was a nonviolent movement.  
As a whole, the Citizens’ Radio Incident has suited our comprehensive version 
of the definition, so it can be included as a civil disobedience movement in Hong 
Kong. The following is a summary of factual data and analysis of the movement’s 
emergence. 
                                                 
56 The images shown to the public, and how they are received, is definitely an important factor 
affecting the final expression of a movement. One case to note is Bull Connor’s decision to oppress 
the demonstrators in Birmingham with fire hoses and police dogs. It was well shot and horrified 
Americans (PBS, 2006). It was crucial to the whole impression the civil rights movement conveyed to 
the public.  
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Event Organizers Celebrities’ 
participation 
OFTA / Police Arrest? Prosecution? 
2005. 09 
Formally applied for a license from 
BA57 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
N/A N/A N/A 
2005. 10. 03 
1st Broadcast (1 hour) 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
- Raymond Wong 
- Lam Yuk Wah 
No N/A 
2005. 10. 06 
Applied for trial-broadcast from BA58 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
N/A N/A N/A 
2006. 07. 28 Citizens’ N/A Yes – 2006. 08. 29, 10. 13 Yes – 2006. 11. 16, 12. 09 
                                                 
57 (The Citizens' Radio, 2006) 
58 (Sing Tao Daily, 2005, p. A20) 
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The Statement on Open the airwave 
to the public 
Radio and 10. 18 
2007. 04. 20 
Broadcast at Mongkok 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
- Long Hair59 
- Lam Yuk-wah60 
- Tsang Kin-shing61 
- RTHK trade union 
rep.62 
Yes – 2007. 07. 16, on the 
guest63 
Yes – 2007. 07. 3164 
2007. 05. 25 
Broadcast (topic June 4th) 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
- Long Hair65 
- Szeto Wah66 
Yes Yes – 2007. 11. 1967 
                                                 
59 (Metro Hong Kong, 2007, p. P06) 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 (Sing Pao Daily News, 2007a, p. A08) 
65 (Sing Pao Daily News, 2007b, p. A08) 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid. 
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2008. 01. 10 
Broadcast 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
- Cheung Chiu-hung68 
- Lee Wing-tak69 
- Albert Chan Wai-
yip70 
- Long Hair71 
- Emily Lau72 
- Lee Cheuk-yan73 
Yes Yes – 2008. 01. 1274 
(contumacy) 
Table 1 Summary of Citizens’ Radio Incident 
                                                 
68 (The Sun, 2008, p. A06) 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 (Government News, 2008) 
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3.2 Why did the Citizens’ Radio Incident emerge? 
To explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, the author of this 
thesis has found a multi-faceted explanation. This explanation has been found 
through interviews with the participants of the incident. Their views have been 
generalized into a few factors. They are the institutional deficits, a stronger 
constitutional ground, the existence of delegitimizing event and the cleavage within 
the Democratic Party.  
3.2.1 Institutional deficits 
‘Institutional deficits’ means that, except through civil disobedience, 
institutional or lawful ways to change the law were not feasible. Institutional or 
lawful ways, for instance, might be through the legislative branch, through the 
judicial branch, or through lawful protest. This viewpoint resembles the second 
condition raised by John Rawls when he was discussing the justification for civil 
disobedience (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2).  
To examine the possibility of a legislator changing a law in council, we can 
first start with an examination of the related articles in the Basic Law. According to 
the Article 74,  
“Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may 
introduce bills in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which 
do not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government may 
be introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council. The written consent of the 
Chief Executive shall be required before bills relating to government policies are introduced.” 
(HKSAR, 2012) 
This article weakens, if not castrates, the power of an individual member to 
change the government’s policy proactively. If every bill related to public 
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expenditure and political structure cannot be introduced and the written consent of 
the Chief Executive is needed for every bill related to government policies, what 
power still remains in the hands of the legislators? So, the chance to change a law 
through the introducing of a bill is hindered - if not terminated.  
And if the legislator is lucky enough to launch a bill proactively in order to 
change the targeted law, would it be possible for the resulting amendment to be 
passed? According to Annex II of the Basic Law, the procedures for voting on bills 
and motions are largely confined. According to the Section II of the Annex,  
“Unless otherwise provide for in this Law, the Legislative Council shall adopt the following 
procedures for voting on bills and motions:  
The passage of bills introduced by the government shall require at least a simple majority vote 
of the members of the Legislative Council present.  
The passage of motions, bills or amendments to government bills introduced by individual 
members of the Legislative Council shall require a simple majority vote of each of the two 
groups of members present: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned 
by geographical constituencies through direct elections and by Election Committee.” (HKSAR, 
2012)  
The above “separation of vote” arrangement is hindering, if not by intention, 
the passage of any motion, bill or amendment proposed by a legislator - no matter 
from which geographical constituency or in which functional constituency.  
The same idea is shared by an interviewee, when he was explaining why he did 
not seek to change the law via the Legislative Council: 
“There are about 30% (of the defendants in this case), which are or were legislators, out of the 
total number of defendants which is around 30.  We think that under the present political 
structure, being a legislator cannot attain our aim. This is because under the undemocratic 
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setting, the members of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong 
Kong (DAB) or the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) will for sure oppose it.” 
(Tsang, 2013) 
And he went on to elucidate what “undemocratic setting” means:  
“The voice of the citizens, despite having more votes in total, cannot be represented in the 
number of seats.  
Also, with the separation of vote, it is very hard to change a law” (Tsang, 2013)  
However, we can examine how strong the relationship of this factor and the 
emergence of the movement was in the following way. One may argue that, if the 
Legislative branch has been weakened by the Basic Law, why didn’t the Citizens’ 
Radio Incident emerge right after 1997?  
That’s the main point this thesis would like to stress. Although the similar 
argument is common and stated by my interviewee, author of this thesis would not 
regard this factor as the sufficient condition. It is because this is a subjective feeling 
for initiators to feel that “legal/normal ways proved to be no avail”. There would be 
some conditions pre-existing causing these subjective feelings. So, though this 
condition was mentioned by my interviewee, it can be treated as a favorable 
condition (which lessens cost/raise benefit of launching collective movement) only 
but not sufficient condition. In other words, those favorable conditions may enhance 
the convincingness of the acts (or may even draw more attention or raise 
participation rate), but not stimulate the immediate emergence of the acts. This 
question will be answered in section 4.2.3 the existence of delegitimizing event.  
  
 
59 
 
3.2.2 Stronger constitutional ground 
To change law in the judicial branch, a decision made by the judges favoring 
the change has to be sought. That means winning a lawsuit in the courts. To change 
the law in the courts, one depends on the proactive launching of a judicial review or 
winning the case as the defendant(s) of a lawsuit. In the courts, what is being 
weighed is the legal viewpoint. In other words, it is the legality of the arguments 
being weighed that matters and other arguments are not considered. So, before one 
tries to change a law through the judicial branch, one has to think of the validity of 
the legal grounds of their argument.  
To check a law’s legality, the constitutionality of it is a crucial starting point. In 
the pre-1997 era, the Letter Patent and the Royal Instructions were documents 
supporting the rule of the colonial government, rather than constitutional documents 
stating the rights citizens enjoyed and confining the power of the government. So, the 
legal grounds for one to test the constitutionality of a law were limited. But, after the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (HKBORO) took effect in June 1991, important 
legal grounds for people to challenge preexisting laws in Hong Kong were laid75 
(Tam, 2013). This environment was bolstered further after 1st July 1997 when a 
“constitution” was introduced which could provide further constitutional grounds.  
From time to time, there has been evidence showing that the Basic Law 
functions as an important instrument that helps activists show their legitimacy when 
challenging the law. After the first prosecution of Tsang and Leung in 2007, Leung 
made this claim in the court:  
                                                 
75 The HKBORO largely replicates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
It is a higher law than any preexisting law in Hong Kong and if any law in Hong Kong is contrary to 
the HKBORO, the courts are “responsible for enforcing the HKBORO”. 
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“The Citizens’ Radio is just founded by a group of people who wish to voice out their opinion 
via radio broadcasting, their acts are in accordance to the Basic Law, the Bill of Rights and the 
International Covenant.”76  (Hong Kong Daily News, 2007) 
The author would argue that it is an important consideration of activists 
whether to use judicial review or civil disobedience77. This was admitted by one 
interviewee, Leung Kwok-hung, when he said:  
“In the time of the Colonial era, there is no constitution. But since we have the Hong Kong Bill 
of Rights Ordinance (HKBORO) in 1992, we have a stronger legal basis though this is not a 
constitutional base. The ordinance can provide more solid legal ground when we want to 
challenge the law we aim at. …  
This provides a better argument in courts when we are doing civil disobedience”78 (Leung K.-
h. , 2013) 
And he kept on explaining what the difference was in launching a civil 
disobedience movement before and after 1997: 
“Before hand-over, there were civil disobedience movements, but at the time, we don’t even 
have a chance to have hearing (in courts)” (Leung K.-h. , 2013). 
One has to understand that those taking part in a civil disobedience movement 
have to prepare for going to jail. But before being sent there, participants have to be 
judged by the Court to ascertain their guilt. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine the 
strong relationship between the independence of the courts and the likeliness of a 
widespread civil disobedience movement. Not all of the participants of civil 
                                                 
76 Author’s own translation.  
77 When considering whether to use judicial review or civil disobedience, it has been admitted by one 
of my interviewees, Leung Kwok-hung that, “…there is not much difference. We can do both. But for 
sure, civil disobedience can arouse more attention, because of its nature as a mass movement…” 
(Leung K.-h. , 2013). 
78 Although my interviewee was talking about why the Anti-POO demonstration emerged, the author 
of this thesis thinks that it is still applicable in the case of the Citizens’ Radio Incident, as a similar 
civil disobedience to be launched.  
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disobedience movement can “enjoy” their jail time like Gandhi, but they will 
consider the likeliness of being jailed and the likeliness of winning a lawsuit in court 
once they are prosecuted.  
So, similar considerations to the above discussion of the constitutional grounds 
provided by the HKBORO and the Basic Law have indeed encouraged protagonists 
to launch civil disobedience movement. It is because the constitutional/legal grounds 
may act as a catalyst to the mass movement in return. In other words, the movement 
may have a larger chance of getting the blessings of the court if stronger legal 
grounds are provided by some ordinances or the constitution. On the other hand, if 
there is no possibility of winning a lawsuit in court, will people still risk their life or 
resources to bring themselves to lawsuits or even jail? It is harder - if not impossible.  
That’s maybe the reason why, before the establishment of HKBORO and/or the 
Basic Law, civil disobedience had not been consciously employed as a strategy 
(comparing the cases included later, the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident with To 
Kwan-hang’s civil disobedience in 1992; the latter, as a conscious employment of the 
strategy, had been partly encouraged by the establishment of the HKBORO). Here, 
the author wants to show that the lack of constitutional grounds hinders, if not 
terminates the emergence of civil disobedience movements.   
So, once again, stronger constitutional grounds (this time, with the support of 
the HKBORO and/or the Basic Law) did not stimulate the immediate emergence of 
civil disobedience, but did act as a favorable condition. It encouraged the activists to 
employ the means as they knew that they would have stronger legal grounds even if 
they were caught and prosecuted.  
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3.2.3 The Emergence of Delegitimizing Event 
What is then be counted as the sufficient condition? The delegitimizing event, 
author calls it, this is the most direct and the most emphasized point that my 
interviewee provided when he explained why the Citizens’ Radio Incident emerged. 
The Citizens’ Radio emerged with an event, which this thesis calls the Delegitimizing 
Event, in 2004. The event was the Censorship of Albert Cheng Jing-han and 
Raymond Wong Yuk-man (Censorship on Cheng and Wong) (Apple Daily, 2004).  
The importance of this event is out of expectation of the author. To illustrate, it 
has to show the origin of the idea to set-up a radio broadcast station. In interview, 
Tsang Kin-shing claimed: 
“In fact, I was planning to set-up a radio station called the Citizens’ Radio in about 1996 or 1997. 
It is because I was worrying the Rule of the Communist Party in Hong Kong after the handover. 
Our freedom of speech was going to be restricted and oppressed. So, at the time, I was forming a 
group to launch this station.” (Tsang, 2013) 
Tsang went on to explain why the Citizens’ Radio had not emerged in 1996, 
but rather in 2005: 
“However, when we were still in honeymoon, still feeling that 1995/96 was the golden era and 
the full blossom of Cheng and Wong, there was no problem. But suddenly, when they were 
censored, I was then awakened. I started to think that it cannot be waited for longer. However, it 
had been delayed for 9 years.” (Tsang, 2013) 
He tried to explain his viewpoint on the nature of their censorship:  
“At the time of 2005, Cheng and Wong were holding a level of audience at 5 hundred to 6 
hundred thousand. Still, there is no one who can catch up. Commercial Radio Hong Kong 
(CRHK) is a commercial organization which should aim at profit. Why would you censor your 
most-popular commentators? It has to be a political consideration.” (Tsang, 2013) 
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It was this “political consideration” that made Tsang think that it was 
imperative to launch a Citizens’ Radio to safeguard freedom of speech. Freedom of 
speech, as an important corner stone of development of Hong Kong, is one of the 
general beliefs or values mentioned while we were discussing the element 
contributing to legitimacy. When government acts against these values, 
government’s legitimacy would be harmed.  
In this case, censorship on Cheng and Wong had alarmed Tsang Kin-shing, on 
his concern that freedom of speech he treasures would be harmed. The censorship 
would in return harmed government’s legitimacy and also, enhanced the legitimacy 
of the acts protecting the value above. So, this time, the censorship on Cheng and 
Wong acted as a sufficient condition in the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident 
as a kind of civil disobedience movement. It stimulated its emergence and its 
emergence was the immediate product of the stimulus.  
3.2.4 Cleavage within the Democratic Party  
This last factor is relatively indirect when compared to the previous two. 
However, this factor, the cleavage between the social activist(s) the author 
interviewed and the “traditional” Democrats, is emphasized when explaining why 
some means were used at certain points in time.  
The cleavage between Tsang Kin-shing, as a “Young Turk” and other 
democrats in the Democratic Party is well-known. However, this thesis is not going 
to study their personal relationship, but to focus on how this cleavage helped 
constitute the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident.  
The cleavage was discussed in interview with Tsang: 
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“In 1996, they, the good-for-nothing, challenged the Provisional Legislative Council just with 
gathering signature on streets. We also gathered signature, but we brought the signatures to 
Beijing and directly went to Lu Ping79. We asked for an instant shut-down of the Provisional 
Legislative Council.” (Tsang, 2013) 
The differences between Tsang and the other democrats were emphasized 
during interview, mainly when discussing the innovativeness of means and ideology. 
Firstly, on innovativeness of means:  
“The most important thing lied with the change on the institution. For this, I have thought of a 
lot of ways different from the traditional one. Those ‘old’ Democrats, they were coming from 
schools, only known how to denounce by tongue and pen, protest and demonstrate. The most 
extreme case is just hunger strike and protest with letter written in blood. That’s it, no more. 
We are different. We stick with ‘an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth’. You can call it 
‘radical’, but we are not aiming to hurt other’s lives even though we are radical” (Tsang, 2013) 
The setting-up of a Citizens’ Radio also constituted a difference of means: 
“In the transition period of handover, Uncle Wah (Seto Wah) told us that it will be a harsh 
winter. He urged us to prepare our own resource to go through this severe winter which might 
last long. So, I told them I was planning to set-up a Citizens’ Radio and I had raised some 
money. However, gossip outburst. There were some people in our party attack me and saying 
that the money raised was for my own spending. They even claimed that the money raised was 
for my gambling on horse racing and spent seven hundred thousand for each game. I replied 
‘that is insane’” (Tsang, 2013) 
This highlighted that the means Tsang advocated was not supported by the 
majority of his colleagues in the Democratic Party. As one might imagine, if a means 
is not recognized and supported by colleagues, it will either be postponed or carried 
                                                 
79 Lu Ping was the Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office.  
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out with like-minded colleagues. This related to the Young Turks of the party and 
their ideology. Tsang describes the Young Turks in this way: 
“It is because of the minimium wage, which is the Young Turks’ belief. We thought that we 
should have it. Young Turks included Gary Fan Kwok-wai, Andrew Cheng Ka-fu. However, 
they are not on the same front with us. They stayed in the party, but Andrew To Kwan-hang, 
Chan Kwok-leung and I were out immediately.” (Tsang, 2013) 
This fragmentation within the Democratic Party did not start the Citizens’ 
Radio immediately, but gathered like-mind Young Turks together for future 
development. So, the differences of means and ideology did not directly contribute to 
the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio, but more or less encouraged the emergence of 
the Citizens’ Radio. One can imagine that, if Tsang had stayed in the same party, his 
decision to launch a Citizens’ Radio might have been hindered even if the 
“delegitimizing event” had happened, due to the lack of party support with resources 
and like-mind companions. So, the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio had been 
encouraged by the cleavage.80 And, coincidently, the change of electoral method in 
2000 may need to be taken into consideration when considering the fragmentation.81  
This cleavage acted as a favorable condition, but not sufficient condition. The 
differences of ideology and party line gathered the like-minded Young Turks 
together. Whether this gathering also attracted resources supporting the 
establishment of the Citizens’ Radio is unknown, but what is known is this gathering 
encouraged them to employ new means which were banned before. The employment 
                                                 
80 Note that here the author doesn’t want to claim that it was “caused” by the cleavage - as it is really 
hard to know whether it was the different thought on means that caused the cleavage or vice versa.  
81 See (Ma & Choy, 1999). It has generalized the relationship between the evolution of the electoral 
system and party politics - from 1991 as more pluralistic, to 1995 more polarized and to 1998 more 
fragmented (Ma & Choy, 1999, p. 285). Also, the intra-camp competition within the pro-democracy 
camp was more vigorous than that of the pro-PRC camp at the time (Ma & Choy, 1999, p. 304).  
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of civil disobedience may be one such means in the list, but it still had to wait for the 
sufficient condition for its emergence. 
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3.3 Chapter Summary 
In fact, we can simplify the above discussion within the perspective of 
justifiability and stimulus. The first factor, the institutional deficit (or one can call it 
Legislative deficit), is about the justifiability of the acts (civil disobedience) in the 
eyes of others - as it is easy to question “whether there is no other way out”. It would 
be favorable to the acts if the institutional deficit was obvious in the eyes of others.  
The second factor, the stronger constitutional grounds, is a positive indicator of 
the justifiability of the movement. If the stance had stronger legal/constitutional 
grounds, it may have a larger impact on the public and help change their views on the 
movement. Also, it may encourage the activists to risk their freedom to pursue the 
collective goal(s). The stronger the constitutional grounds, the more favorable the 
condition was.  
The third factor was the existence of delegitimizing event. This is the most 
direct factor that immediately affected not only the justifiability but also stimulated 
the emergence of civil disobedience movement. In the author’s view, we can 
understand the mechanism via the nature of this special way of protest. As civil 
disobedience, in Bedau’s words, is a process of moral education, when people 
experience some issue that greatly “delegitimize” the opposite side, the moral 
grounds of the civil disobedience are enhanced and the illegal acts are more 
convincing and become legitimate. This factor can be emphasized and reexamined 
with the following case.  
The last factor was the cleavage within the Democratic Party. This seems to be 
a specific factor of the Citizens’ Radio Incident only. But, indeed, we can link it with 
the first factor. As the “traditional” democrats in this case represented the moderate 
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side (compared with civil disobedience) which emphasized lawful protest and other 
institutional means, the cleavage just encouraged the “radicals” to look for non-
institutional/traditional ways of protest. It was, again, a favorable condition to the 
emergence of civil disobedience.  
To sum up, the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio Incident was encouraged by 
many factors and stimulated by the delegitimizing effect (in this case the censorship 
of Cheng and Wong). The institutional deficits, stronger constitutional grounds and 
the cleavage are favorable conditions. The delegitimizing effect is sufficient condition. 
These factors are not yet well-organized and not yet able to be inferred from other 
cases in Hong Kong. But the generalization of the stimulating factors will be the 
work of the last chapter. In the following chapter, the conditions generalized from 
interviews will be posed first and subsequently analyzed. 
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Chapter 4 Anti-Public Order Ordinance (POO) 
Demonstrations 
Another series of civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong was directed 
against the Public Order Ordinance. This law originated from the Summary Offence 
Ordinance and, being passed in 1967, swiftly provided a legal basis to oppress the 
riot (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p. 8). This law was not abandoned 
after the 1967 Riot and was used for restraining the social movements of the 1970s.82 
Even in 1971, the places designated for lawful assembly were restricted to only five 
and the power to restrict assemblies beforehand and to terminate assemblies instantly 
was given to police inspectors and higher ranks (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 
1994, p. 8). Conflict escalated throughout the 1970s. Then, the tight restriction on the 
number of participants that constituted an illegal assembly was slightly loosened in 
1980 (Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p. 8). During the 1970s, civil 
disobedience was not used as a strategy to expand the rights of citizens. However, in 
1979 the Yau Ma Tei (YMT) Boat People Incident emerged as a civil disobedience 
movement suiting the minimalist definition,83 in the sense that the means (civil 
disobedience) was not consciously employed to frustrate the law, but merely as a 
similar reaction with some of the characteristics of the special way of protest.  
4.1 Minimalist Civil Disobedience: 1979 Yau Ma Tei Boat-People 
Incident 
Minimalist civil disobedience will be used to describe the incident in 1979, the 
Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident, due to the fact that it had certain qualities of civil 
                                                 
82 For the employment of the law on restraining social movements, see (Hong Kong Federation of 
Students, 1994, p. 20). 
83 Defined as “…something that serves to illustrate the typical qualities of a class; model; exemplar…” 
or “…the original or model on which something is based or formed…” (Dictionary.com, 2014).  
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disobedience, but not all of them – that of the maximalist definition.84 This is 
because if one is to use an action for moral education, the means has to be 
consciously employed as a strategy. In this case, it was not. So, let’s see what 
happened and why the author calls it a minimalist civil disobedience, but not simply 
civil disobedience.  
4.1.1 Origin: Why had it been “an incident”? 
Before the incident broke out, the living environments of the boat people had 
been a social problem. Within the Yau Ma Tei Typhoon Shelter, there were a lot of 
boat-people who used to fish and also lived on the boats. However, when the fishing 
boats were worn out, they lost their way to earn a living. So, they needed to work 
onshore. But, still, they lived on the boats - for two reasons: Firstly, the wage they 
earned from their labor was too low to pay for the rent of private tenements. 
Secondly, they had to wait a long time to qualify to live in public housing (Chan S.-
h. , 2007, p. 46). And for various reasons85, more and more boat-people moored their 
boats in the typhoon shelter. Their living conditions got worse. It was common for 
children to fall into the sea and for the boats to catch on fire. The hygiene conditions 
were also bad and people living there found it hard to access medical treatment due 
to transportation problems. Not to mention a lack of electricity (The Hong Kong 
University Students' Union, 1978, pp. 6-7). 86 These marginalized fishers attracted a 
lot of attention from the wider public. However, those who really got known what 
                                                 
84 For detail, see the end of section 1.2.1 in Chapter 1.  
85 According to the investigation carried out by the Concern Group of the University of Hong Kong, 
most of the boat-people living in the typhoon shelter were the “weed-out” - eliminated from the 
industry by machinery fishing, fishers from other regions, pollution from industrialization and the 
attractiveness of onshore jobs (The Hong Kong University Students' Union, 1978). So, one can infer 
that many of the people staying on the boats were elderly or children - the youngsters and adults 
getting occupation onshore.  
86 For the general living condition of boat-people, one may see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG81e5t0kVE, which is a video shot by RTHK on the history of 
Aberdeen Typhoon Shelter.  
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was really happening and gave a helping hand, were students and newly emerged 
“pressure groups” that got onto the boats (Chan S.-h. , 2013). Being one of the 
participants, Chan Shun-hing remembers that:  
“…we, as a volunteer, were introduced by Gam Chai (甘仔)87 to have acquaintance with those 
boat-people who sought help as their boat sunk. Boat-sunk is not only about losing a place for 
living, but all of they have, even their lives. …In avoidance of boat-sunk, they will tie their 
boats up. However, the fire may burn them out altogether…” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, pp. 47-48).88 
Under these severe conditions, the people’s demands of getting onshore 
intensified and their works were more organized by mid-1977 (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 
49). Chan illustrated:  
“Besides us, a group of volunteers, the relatively progressive social workers from the Society 
for Community Organization (SOCO) … also get to the boats, visit them and to help them 
registered, as a collective movement to demand from the government” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 
49).  
Their protests intensified from 1977 to 1979. Chan Shun-hing mentioned in her 
interview:  
“The activity was escalated continuously, initially the Housing Department, later the Chief 
Secretary’s Office and finally the Government House” (Chan S.-h. , 2013). 
The place was getting near to the center of colonial rule for sure, but also their 
way of protest created some fear in the government. On 16 Sept 1977, there were two 
hundred boat-people carrying a broken boat to the Chief Secretary’s Office (Chan S.-
h. , 2007, p. 48). The author doesn’t know if their intention was to draw the focus of 
media but, in fact, they did just that. Chan Shun-hing recalled that “…we called the 
                                                 
87 That’s Priest Franco Mella who had strived for the social welfare and basic human rights of the 
minority in Hong Kong.  
88 All quotations of this source are my own translations from Chinese.  
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reporters when we had any protest…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013). Another symbolized 
protest was: 
“…in April, there was a child fallen into the sea and died. … As a response, a group of 
progressive social workers prepared a small funeral and all dressed in black, and marched to 
the Housing Department. We, for sure, had not applied license from government. We had not 
been arrested, but been warned that ‘we (police) reserved the rights to arrest you’. For sure, this 
had not become true, because we were not boat-people, but social workers who were much 
stronger…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013). 
On 7 Jan 1979, the boat people were arrested while on the way to the 
Government House. This has been called as an “incident” as it aroused a lot of 
concern, especially since most of them were elderly or children, but still charged 
with illegal assembly. So, this arrest aroused public interest not only in the boat-
people but also the law about an era of riots. This interesting mechanism was 
remarked upon by Chan Shun-hing:  
“In fact, we had not applied for the license for demonstrations for years. If the police was 
strictly following the law, why wouldn’t they arrest us in many previous times? The sudden 
implementation of the law would have another consideration behind, we speculate that’s just 
because the establishment did not want the social movement to develop. Then they chose to 
oppress it… However, ridiculously, once they arrested us, the attention was drawn from the 
mass, especially on the Public Order Ordinance” (Chan S.-h. , 2013). 
As shown below by Figure 1 and 2, the arrest had drawn the media’s attention.  
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Figure 2 Sing Tao Daily-1979-1-8 
 
Figure 3 Ming Pao-1979-1-8 
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4.1.2 Why is it a “minimalist civil disobedience”?  
As shown above, the arrest of the boat-people with the Public Order Ordinance 
broke out in 1979, labelled as the so-called Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident. The 
problem had lasted for years and the protests demanding reasonable shelter had 
escalated and finally ended with the arrest of boat-people and their supporters. 
In the following passages, the issue will be looked at closely, to see why it is 
not considered only a minimalist civil disobedience. The characteristics of civil 
disobedience include nonviolence, publicness, illegality and a will carried out 
“conscientiously with the intent to frustrate the laws, polices or decision of 
government” (for the minimalist definition) (Bedau, 1961) and as “an exercise in 
public moral education” (for the maximalist definition) (Bedau, 1991).  
Was the Yau Ma Tei Boat-People Incident violent? It seems not because, even 
at the moment when they were arrested for illegal assembly, the participants were 
just on trucks heading to Government House. According to the newspaper (Figure 3), 
there were 48 ladies, 18 men and 5 children (age ranged from 8 to 65). The report 
seems to focus on the wide age-range of the participants involved. It seems that there 
was no violent act conducted by these people.  
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Figure 4 Sing Tao Daily-1979-1-09 
The criteria of “public”, “illegal” and “intention” can be discussed 
simultaneously. According to the interview with Chan Shun Hing, throughout the 
years they had never applied for any license from the police for any gathering or 
assembly. With regard to the warning they received in the demonstration to the 
Housing Department at April, she said:  
“Before 7th January 1979, we had been warned and even stopped by the police with the Public 
Order Ordinance. I remember that should be the Christmas. They said: ‘if you guys don’t apply 
for demonstration and go further, we will arrest you.’ … But we had not feared for that. We 
would not apply for that just because you said so. This is what we had done for years” (Chan 
S.-h. , 2013) 
In her book, she described the psychology of the participants:  
“Due to the warning of the policemen on 24th Dec 1978, the participants had prepared that if 
they were not going apply permit, the policemen would took action in the following activity as 
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a deterrence. But after meeting with the boat-people, we had made a decision: not to apply for 
that” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 53). 
So, from the above data collected from interview, the psychology of the 
participants at the moment was clear. They knew that what they were doing was 
illegal. But for the reasons below, they had not applied for license.  
1) They knew that the Public Order Ordinance was a law set in the very 
moment; it should not be applicable at that place and time. 
2) The rights of demonstrations and protests should be a part of civil rights. 
3) They had acted similarly for years. Why should the same acts suddenly 
become illegal? 
Supplementing with a document89 collected by Chan Shun-hing, the rationale 
becomes clearer. A supporter participating in the sit-in demonstration outside the 
court wrote:  
“From the fact that the boat-people has lobbied many departments without any reward, the 
government is obviously indifferent to the need of the people. Applying for a license from that, 
it is just like ‘asking a tiger for its skin’. We declare: ‘democratic demonstration is our basic 
rights, not a rights based on application’.” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 57) 
The rationale behind the decision of “not to apply for a license” was rights-
related. Regarding the implications of this incident, Prof Chan wrote:  
“Regarding ‘owning a suitable home’ as a humanistic treatment and rights to protest as a civil 
rights were the important implication to the society brought by the boat-people and the 
supporters, through their practice. In other words, these practices and demands had shaped the 
ideology or the shape of the early-stage civil society of Hong Kong” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 58).  
                                                 
89 Special Issue of the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident (my own translation) (油麻地艇戶事件特刊) 
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It was obviously seen as a process to empower the definition of citizenship and 
the participant’s identity as citizens through a claim on rights. It was certainly done 
under the sunlight or, in other words, publicly. Also, it was related to the public 
indirectly, not only the rights of those boat-people, because everyone in the society 
might face the same trouble when they went to protest.  
Furthermore, as admitted, they knew that it was illegal. So, why would the 
author say that it was not civil disobedience movement at its maximalist level? 
What’s the missing element? 
The answer lies with the intention.90 Did the incident aim at changing the law? 
Did the incident aim at educating the public that the law was illegitimate through the 
breaking of it? Consequentially speaking, they did change it?91 But, as claimed by 
interviewees, it was not their intention to change it through breaking it. Also, “moral 
education” was not in their minds as either a tactic or as an aim. They just thought 
that it was irrational to apply for a license. So, they were not really employing civil 
disobedience as a protest means. Also, the means we now call civil disobedience was 
not in their minds. Prof Chan wrote:  
“…at the time, we don’t’ know this decision of ‘noncooperation’ or means should be called 
‘civil disobedience’, we just don’t want to comply to their oppression and not satisfied with 
those faces of the foreign police officers.” (Chan S.-h. , 2007, p. 58) 
It is obvious that the participants in the boat-people incident were not intently 
employing a protest means called civil disobedience, but ended up doing something 
very similar to the theory of civil disobedience (like nonviolent, public, illegal and 
                                                 
90 Intention: 1) to frustrate the laws…of his government (minimalist definition);  
2) to educate the public what is right (high-end definition) 
91 Prof Chan claimed the change on POO (like changing the licensing system to notification system 
and expand the limit on the number of participants from 4 people to more than 30 for assembly and 20 
for procession) later in 1980, was the result of the YMT (Chan S.-h. , 2013). 
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conscientiously). What was missing was just the intention behind the law-breaking 
acts - that is educating the public via breaking the law. So, the incident fulfilled the 
minimalist definition, but not the maximalist definition.  
The first92 emergence of civil disobedience was not learnt from books, but a 
natural response to oppression based upon faith. As Chan Shun-hing explained:  
“…the content of citizenship is not a conceptual thing. It is not only what we learnt from books. 
The content is enriched through practice. When you had seen that there is a lot of problem in 
the colony shared by many, we started to question the legitimacy of the colonial 
government. … The content of citizenship was enriched when more space was given by the 
government and more discussions were held…” (Chan S.-h. , 2013).  
Without aiming to change the “unjust” law or to educate the public as to the 
major goals, the YMT incident had fulfilled some of the characteristics of the 
definition (or precisely speaking, it fulfilled the requirement of the minimalist 
definition, but not the maximalist definition).  
This new emergence of the YMT incident as a minimalist civil disobedience in 
Hong Kong, which further development was needed to also fulfil the maximalist 
definition (in this sense, what’s lacking was the consciousness to invite the majority 
to question the law via deliberately breaking it). From observing the reactions of the 
concerned groups, we should be able to see why the means (deliberately breaking the 
law) was not employed and why the history of civil disobedience in Hong Kong did 
not further develop right after this crucial point. 
                                                 
92 According to the author’s research, the YMT Incident was the first civil disobedience that happened 
in Hong Kong. 
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4.2 Why did civil disobedience seldom/never emerge in the early-/mid-
1980s? 
It is an interesting question why there was no relatively large-scale civil 
disobedience movements following the YMT Incident.  This question is important 
because the law had been put under a magnesium lamp by the arrest of the boat-
people and the illegitimacy93 of the law had been exposed in some respects by the 
actions of the police. However, the following actions of the public/concern groups 
were not larger scale civil disobedience movements, but other actions. Why was that?  
Before explaining why there was no relatively large scale civil disobedience 
challenging the POO, we have to explore what had been done at the time by the 
dissenters who thought that the law (POO) was ridiculous.  
According to Professor Fung Ho-lup, the Director of the Society for 
Community Organization (SOCO) in the 1980s, there were other feasible ways rather 
than civil disobedience:  
“In fact, civil disobedience, this term, emerged in the late 1980s. That’s about the time of the 
June 4th Incident. … In the time of 1979, there were more people discussing on pressure groups. 
And for pressure groups, there were lot of ways to attain their goals, like lobbying, policy 
advocates and negotiation with government officials. Civil disobedience is just one of the ways, 
it was not much discussed at our time…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013) 
On the way they had worked to change the unjust law, Fung Ho-lup explained: 
“As the law was unjust, the arrest before had aroused some noise. As the Director of SOCO, I 
sent this piece of news to all of the international organizations we knew. Later on, when I 
                                                 
93 The ridiculousness of the law had been questioned. (The author don’t know if the sense of 
ridiculousness was wide-spread or not.) Fung Ho-lup remembered that “…our defense counsel asked 
the Judge, ‘What if 4 judges went to have lunch together and in their discussion, there are some 
public-related issues, is this illegal?’ The Judge answered, ‘By law, it is.’” (Fung H.-l. , 2013) 
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revealed the secret documents of the colonial government, the document shows that there were 
39 organizations in total. They included welfare, international organizations like OXFAM. 
These international organizations sent their enquiry to the colonial government on this issue…” 
(Fung H.-l. , 2013). 
On the results of the above action, Fung Ho-lup added:  
“The government knew this is indefensible, as the protests were really peaceful, without 
weapons and most of them were just elderly and underprivileged. So on what basis, you need 
to charge them. The government knew that they had to change the law. As a result, there was 
change of the law which was forced by our acts…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013) 
4.2.1 Opening of political system 
The absence of civil disobedience movement right after the YMT Incident 
cannot be explained just by the absence of terminology or ideas for civil 
disobedience. As we have shown, the participants in the YMT Incident also had no 
ideas of civil disobedience in mind, but had consequentially done something similar - 
constructed a minimalist civil disobedience. So, why was the choice of not applying 
for licenses and holding more and more demonstrations not the response of the 
affected groups?  
Fung Ho-lup has his explanation:  
“No need to confront. The government at the time was relatively open. There were many 
small-scale civic groups and pressure groups hoping to discuss certain policy with the officials. 
The officials would say yes. Like SOCO, we just had a dozen of people at the time. We can 
still reach the Chief Secretary who was the highest rank in the colony. So, you see that we 
don’t have incentive to use costly way…” (Fung H.-l. , 2013).  
This is in great contrast to the Citizens’ Radio Incident. In the Citizens’ Radio 
Incident, the initiators thought that the institution was not open and that they had to 
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employ other, non-institutional means. In the YMT case, the potential initiators had 
not felt the same feeling about the institution they were dealing with. The openness 
of the system and the gestures of the government were important to their 
consideration.  
This can be understood in the light of resource mobilization theory, which the 
cost and benefit of collective movement is being weighed. The openness of the 
system would provide alternative with less cost to the dissenters. The initiators, 
under this circumstance, would not choose the costly way to attain their aim. This 
can be noted as absence of the favorable condition for launching civil disobedience 
(if favorable condition is the institutional deficit).  
It would constitute an absence of the favorable condition for the emergence of 
civil disobedience to happen. Fung Ho-lup agrees that: 
“Not between use or not to use the means (Civil Disobedience), but the government, through 
the change of the law, implemented it softly and not to oppress all the time…” (Fung H.-l. , 
2013). 
The above “openness” of the government seems to be the dominant image of 
the government in the 1980s in the eyes of the dissenters. This openness was not only 
confined within ad-hoc negotiations with higher officials, but also being 
institutionalized with the opening of elections.  
And more or less at the same time, the power decentralization initiatives of the 
colonial government had been launched. Whatever the intention of the move towards 
power decentralization was, the opening of the closed system was started - and this 
opening had drawn significant attention from the dissenters.  
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Both Fung Ho-lup and Chan Shun-hing had mentioned that they had thought 
about and even been invited to run for the District Board Elections (Fung H.-l. , 2013) 
(Chan S.-h. , 2013). Readers may think that their experiences might not shed much 
insight on the people in Hong Kong as a whole, but it is true to say that their 
experiences more or less revealed the attitude of progressive social workers. 
Nonetheless, both of them mentioned the change of attitude to a less skeptical one in 
the social workers realm. And even if not all social workers agreed about getting into 
the establishment, their focus had been shifted: 
“For those who had not run for the elections, they stayed outside and at the same time, formed 
a lot of monitoring groups for monitoring the work of the representatives…” (Fung H.-l. , 
2013). 
Less costly way to air dissent was provided to these previous social activists. A 
new type of “election-based mobilization”94 replaced the previously autonomous 
organizing means that had developed from the 1970s (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 156).  
The interest groups that had emerged in the 1970s were also beginning to form 
united fronts backing up the struggle at the new arena. A process of transition is 
shown according to Fung Ho-lup, by the cooperation among the interest and pressure 
groups that emerged from time to time:  
“The Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union (HKPTU), SOCO and the related pressure 
groups had had a close relationship. We organized several movements together, for instance, 
against the rising price of the public sector services and also the opposition against the building 
of the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant. These movements were just among our group of people, like 
Lau Chin-shek and Seto Wah. We have not used the term (civil society), but this type of 
                                                 
94 Author’s own translation from the Chinese source (參政主導的民眾動員). 
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cooperation among the pressure groups had been challenging the colonial government…” 
(Fung H.-l. , 2013). 
The united-front formed by the 1970s interest groups had become the support 
for the new momentum. In the past, social movements were the sole means in which 
activists could fight for interests. However, after the mid-1980s, the opening of the 
political system through elections had opened new gateway for members of civil 
society. This means the previously sole means were not their only option, they could 
mobilize social movements to support their struggle within institutional arena - like 
the cases in the above quotation. However, conflict was bound to grow as time went 
by due to the different natures of the two arena. Institutional arena functions by 
compromise. Social movements, however, don’t need much compromise in short 
term. The “doctrine” gradually generated from getting into the establishment had 
hindered the emergence of civil disobedience (this will be discussed later at 5.3.1). In 
the author’s view, this kind of cooperation among organizations had expanded the 
meaning of civil rights (e.g. rights to participate in politics) and strengthened civil 
society. Like in the case of the YMT incident, this expanded sense of civil rights 
included the right to live in a suitable shelter and reflected property rights. Freedom 
of speech and assembly had been included somehow, but there was not really a 
massive movement challenging the prevailing norms of freedom of assembly as set 
out in the POO. However, the rights on free assembly had not been further expanded. 
The political rights jumped in, to be the focus. The absence of further movements 
struggling for further freedom of assembly can be attributed to the result of mixed 
factors, like the special experience of the Sino-British negotiations, which drew the 
focus of the people to specific topics, and the relatively tolerant attitude of the 
  
 
84 
 
colonial government in the transition period which gave an absence of delegitimizing 
effect. 
4.2.2 Issue of the Handover 
The special experience brought by the Sino-British negotiation had drawn the 
focus on the issue of handover. Rather than the specific law targeted, the issue of 
handover and further institutional change had been a better option to put their effort 
in. As Fung Ho-lup comments: 
“The Handover issue of Hong Kong had pushed all the other issues aside” (Fung H.-l. , 2013) 
With the less costly means to air their demand, the favorable condition is 
missed (institutional deficit). It would less likely for activists to choose a rather 
costly means, civil disobedience. With the more attractive option which will bring 
larger benefit than a specific law change, the activists would incline to spend their 
effort on it rather than advocating change of the POO.  
4.2.3 Absence of sufficient condition 
Also, the government had seldom used the POO to arrest dissenters. It would 
not be imperative enough for initiators to claim “it is the right time to break the 
unjust law in order to attain change of it”. It was all less likely to put the dissenters 
on the same front and the groups affected would have found it harder to gain support 
from other, non-affected sympathizers (or civil society, if one likes to call them that). 
As a special means of protest, civil disobedience relies more on the participation of 
sympathizers, gained through “moral education”. So, in the absence of oppression, 
the issue would have been harder to be put on agenda or draw the focus of the 
majority (or to put it, without the sufficient condition).  
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4.2.4 Summary 
To sum up, the opening of the political system also drove political discontent 
into institutional channels (less costly means are provided). And the Sino-British 
negotiations drew the attention of the society, further disfavoring the launch of civil 
disobedience (larger benefit issue has drawn the focus). The favorable condition is 
absent.  
The absence of the arrest of dissenters with the POO can be understood as an 
absence of a delegitimizing event. It was the most direct effect contributing to 
emergence/absence of civil disobedience movements in most of the time in 1980s. 
As the government had not used the POO to arrest the dissenters, the people against 
the law did not have evidence to show the government oppressing the protestors with 
an unjust law. This greatly harmed the justifiability of further civil disobedience even 
if civil disobedience movement has been launched. So, the absence of sufficient 
condition contributed to the non-existence of civil disobedience movements in early-
/mid- 1980s and the absence of favorable condition would contribute to the 
insignificance of it even the movement is launched. 
However, the story seems to have been changed by the incident of 1989.   
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4.3 Post-1989 protests against PRC’s crackdown on democratic 
movement 
The effect of 1989 on Hong Kong was massive and drastic - the long lasting 
sit-in of the students in Tiananmen Square had unquestionably taught a lesson to the 
people of Hong Kong (Fung H.-l. , 2013) (To, 2014). The action of the students at 
Tiananmen Square posed a question to the people of Hong Kong and challenged the 
status quo of the time. It not only inspired people in Hong Kong on the means of 
protest, but also changed the sociopolitical condition in which civil disobedience 
were encouraged to be employed.  
4.3.1 A lesson from Mainland China 
To Kwan Hang experienced a drastic change in his thoughts after the June 4th 
incident. As the Secretary General of the Hong Kong Federation of Students in April 
immediately before the June 4th incident, I sought his views for this paper and he 
explained his experiences:  
“I had never heard of ‘civil disobedience’ before the democratic movement in Beijing. The 
students there had violated the laws and regulations through their actions and later on, someone 
conceptualized these acts and from there, I learnt…” (To, 2014).  
The scene was set:  
“After 1989 and before 1991, that was the time HKFS discussed civil disobedience most often, 
and the mostly cited example would be Wu’erkaixi (吾爾開希)95 leading the students of 
Beijing Normal University (北京師範大學) confronting with police for the protest on 70th 
anniversary of May Fourth Movement. Some students cited this and asked ‘would you think 
that’s right?’” (To, 2014) 
                                                 
95 See Photo 1: Wu’erkaixi is the one holding a flag. Photo from: 
http://staff.yck2.edu.hk/departments/social/web%20use/investigation/inv64.htm 
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Photo 1: Wu’erkaixi leading students confronting with police 
This shocked To Kwan-hang at the time and, from this, he questioned the 
status quo: 
“That means I started to question the doctrine, so-called ‘lawful struggle’ (合法鬥爭). I 
remember that this was invented by Szeto Wah who said for the sake of movement, one has to 
attract as much crowd as possible. If you say to the people that the movement is illegal, who 
would then come? ... However, if we are not only thinking of the number of people, but the 
self-consciousness of the struggle (抗爭意識) ... Then, this is different story…” (To, 2014).  
To Kwan-hang went further to explain that:  
“It is because if ‘lawful struggle’ is the only doctrine we have to follow, the authority would set 
more and more rules and regulations to confine you. Is it needed to follow? If so, one day you 
may not need to go out for demonstrations. And what’s more important is, if there was no 
unlawful struggle before, would you have a lawful struggle today?” (To, 2014) 
To Kwan-hang makes one very important point here. From To Kwan-hang’s 
experience, we know that the later participants (or even leaders) of the civil 
disobedience were not implanting this way of protest from the Western World or 
India, but were drawing inspiration from the democratic movement in Beijing.96 
                                                 
96 There is also a discontinuity to the social movements of the 1970s. 
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That’s crucial to the development of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong. 
However, as one may know, the civil disobedience movements launched by To 
Kwan-hang and his companions did not come immediately after the June 4th Incident, 
but sometime later. Why was that? 
4.3.2 Government suddenly reemployed the law 
“Interviewer: You declared not to apply the license on 24th December 1989, and then really did 
civil disobedience on 4th June 1992. Is that right? 
To Kwan-hang: Yes, in fact, from 1989 Dec to 1992 June, we had done nothing on challenging 
the law”97 (To, 2014). 
From the point of being inspired, through to the declarations that taking action 
was necessary,98 and then to the point when action actually took place99 was a period 
of about one and a half years. Why would that be? 
On the reason why the first maximalist civil disobedience100 after the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident was in 1992, To Kwan-hang explained:  
“The law would become a question only when you had been troubled by that. In the past, even 
though I had not applied the license, the authority would give you the license or just let you 
went on without it. No one would felt that there was any importance on the law because it just 
ceased to be working when no one had enforced it” (To, 2014). 
So, when had the government troubled the protestors with the law? 
                                                 
97 From author’s research, HKFS had done something, which has been summarized in Table 2. For To 
Kwan Hang, 1992.06.04 would be his first day to practice civil disobedience (To, 2010, p. 138)  
98 From being warned as holding an unauthorized assembly on 24th Dec 1989, To Kwan-hang had 
declared not to apply license from the Police afterwards (Apple Daily, 2012).  
99 The first civil disobedience after 1989, according to To Kwan-hang, was the one on 4th June 1992 
(To, 2014).  
100 This is the first civil disobedience that fulfilled both the minimalist and high-end definition, 
according to this author’s research. The critical distinction is the leader’s consciousness - whether 
he/she would employ this means consciously as a process of “moral education”. In To’s quotation on 
“self-consciousness of the struggle (抗爭意識)”, a clear aim is to educate the participants on what 
should be done.  
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According to To Kwan-hang, the attitude towards protestors had changed from 
tolerant to intolerant from 1990 (To, 2014). His observations on the mechanisms 
behind this change are interesting:  
“My thought is the colonial government had been suffering a great pressure from the China 
side. After 1989, should Xujiatun (許家屯) be a watershed? We haven’t known yet. But after 
the ‘929 Event’,101 there was an interlude. As reported by the South China Morning Post, a 
letter written by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the PRC mentioned that the British was not planning to turn Hong Kong into a basis 
to overthrow the regime in China. The letter even cited the example of ‘929 Event’ in which 
some members of the April Fifth Action were arrested” (To, 2014)
                                                 
101 929 Event here means: To Kwan Hang, as invited, planned to show a slogan abruptly in the 
cocktail party held by Xinhua News Agency, but failed. At the same time, the members of the April 
Fifth Action had a serious conflict with a policeman in Causeway Bay.  
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Date/Event Government’s Action HKFS Response 
1989.12.24 Few hundred students 
started procession from the Hong 
Kong Polytechnic (see Figure 4) 
- Asked for a license (the students had notified the 
police, but not applied for a license)  
- Ask the students to go in rows not more than 20 
persons 
- Registered the information of the leaders (See 
Figure 4) 
- Sent a warning letter (Hong Kong Federation of 
Students, 1994, p. 13) 
- Declared that they will no longer apply a 
license for protest from police (Hong Kong 
Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13) 
1990.06.03 Few dozens of students 
protest before the Xinhua News 
Agency Buildings 
- Police refused the demand of the students on 
protesting at the front door of the building 
(Hong Kong Federation of Students, 1994, p. 
13) 
- About 50 students trespassed the frontier 
“nonviolently” (Hong Kong Federation of 
Students, 1994, p. 13) 
1991.02.01 Protest before the Xinhua - Well prepared with fences (Hong Kong - Trespass the frontier (Hong Kong 
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News Agency Buildings 102 Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13) Federation of Students, 1994, p. 13) 
1991.06.02 A hundred of students 
protest before the Xinhua News 
Agency Buildings 
- Deploy policemen before the front door to 
defend the building (Hong Kong Federation of 
Students, 1994, p. 50) 
-- 
1992.06.05 Few hundred of students 
protest before the Xinhua News 
Agency buildings 
- Interrupt the processions in the meantime 
- Deploy many polices around the building and 
put fences outside few dozen meters of the 
building 
- Prosecuted the three leaders of HKFS (Tsoi Yiu 
Cheong, Wong Ching Man and To Kwan Hang) 
- Reject the suggestion (Binding Over) of 
the prosecuting side 
- Hope to change the law via the judicial 
branch with the newly passed HKBORO 
Table 2 Summary on civil disobedience movements done by HKFS from 1989 to 1992 
                                                 
102 Unknown number of students 
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Figure 4 Sing Tao Daily-1989-12-25 
From the above table (Table 2) and Figure 4, we can see that, from 1989.12.24 
onwards, HKFS members had already carried out actions fulfilling the definition of 
civil disobedience (it is discussed later on whether they were only minimalist or both 
minimalist and maximalist). The number of participants ranged from few dozen to a 
few hundred.  
So, in fact, from 1990.06.03 on, there had been HKFS students carrying out 
actions fulfilling the minimalist requirement of civil disobedience. On the question of 
whether their acts fulfilled the maximalist definition, the author can seek to confirm 
it with the participants themselves and try to understand whether they were 
consciously doing that.  
According to the author’s research, we can only confirm that, when To Kwan 
Hang did his civil disobedience on 1992.06.04, he had did indeed have that 
consciousness in mind (To, 2014). So, whether it was Tsoi Yiu Cheong or To Kwan 
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Hang starting first, the maximalist civil disobedience movement in Hong Kong was a 
product of inspiration and stimulated by the police’s interruption. However, why did 
the police suddenly employ the law? 
Describing the behavior of the colonial government of the time, To Kwan-hang 
has used the term ‘beneficent autocrat’. This beneficent autocrat had her own 
political calculation to make: a balance of political interest and acting accordingly 
(To, 2014). That sheds some light on the following facts.  
From 1990 on, the old ways of tolerating protestors (like giving licenses to 
them proactively, or escorting protestors without arresting or seeking conflict with 
them) had gone. This new attitude lasted until the Patten era (To, 2014) (the reason 
behind this atmosphere in Patten’s era will be discussed in the last chapter).  
To show more clearly how the attitude changed in the era, some discussion of 
relevant facts needs to take place: 
“Using our example,103 before Xuijiatun left, the policemen didn’t really care what you had 
done before the Xinhua News Agency Building. But right after that, Zhou Nan came, you 
could not do the same thing. However, later when Chris Patten came, you could do that again 
because Chris Patten was simply confronting with the China side…” (To, 2014).  
To Kwan-hang went on to raise more concrete examples to show that the 
arrests and charges brought on them were a result of political considerations:  
“We had a lot of experience. We had many protest or demonstrations where radical acts were 
within, the authority had not charged us. Although quite disordered scene was caused by 
burning tires or conflicting with the police, they had not even arrested you to the police station. 
Even though for that time I had trespassed into the venue of the Provisional Legislative 
                                                 
103 Here he means the charges and prosecution of unauthorized assembly on To Kwan Hang, Richard 
Tsoi Yiu Cheong and Wong Ching Man. Their prosecution was on their illegal protest on June 4 th 
1992, before the Xinhua News Agency Building (To, 2010).  
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Council when I was going against it, I was not prosecuted with unauthorized assembly. They 
just told me that they might charge me with misconduct or assaulting a police, but 
consequently, they had proposed a ‘binding over’ (撤銷起訴) to me. This was not the only 
instance, but also the one trespassing to Lok Ma Chau…” (To, 2014).  
4.3.3. Factors affecting significance 
Although being oppressed with an “unjust law”, and the protestors having 
consciously embedded ‘civil disobedience’ in their heads, the civil disobedience did 
not successfully transform into a larger movement that was comparable to the one in 
2000. To Kwan-hang elucidated: 
“As I have experienced some colonial era, I have an impression that the colonial government 
was relatively responsive, remember that it is just relatively, and also relatively smart. She 
knew how to flexibly use politics to solve the political problem, not always oppressing. … This 
makes the civil disobedience became less convincing especially when people can feel the 
freedom. For sure, people’s consciousness (on political rights) are really important, because 
doing a civil disobedience has a lot of challenges to the people themselves. Why must it illegal? 
Why not a legal protest opposing the law?” (To, 2014) 
Another explanation was on the political culture: 
“Interviewer: To ask people confront illegally, would not be the majority at the time, right? 
To Kwan-hang: Yes, because Hong Kong people had not yet got used to that.” (To, 2014) 
So, in the case of To Kwan-hang, as one of the pioneers in the history of civil 
disobedience in Hong Kong, the emergence of civil disobedience was not really a 
matter of participants and leaders, but of the right time to carry it out. Being inspired 
by the June 4th Incident in Beijing, the legitimacy of the doctrine developed from the 
1970s, the so-called “lawful struggle”, was challenged by some groups. Although 
they constituted only a minority, we can also see that they had a new consciousness 
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regarding struggle. Forgetting the number of participants, they seemed more inclined 
to focus on the empowerment of the individuals participating.  
The insignificance can be explained not only by the lagging political culture104, 
but also the absence of favorable condition affecting the significance of civil 
disobedience movements. For instance, the political system, from 1989 to 1991, 
would be undergoing a further opening and reform. The Legislative Council was at 
its first time to have seats being elected geographically. It is hard to convince the 
majority why institutional deficit exists. So, in the absence of favorable condition, 
the civil disobedience movements launched would not have a large participation rate.  
Although that may not be significant in some eyes, the post-1989 civil 
disobedience movement is a significant insight on the development of civil 
disobedience movements in Hong Kong. It was the first time this means was 
employed consciously. However, this means was learnt from the experience of the 
student movement in Beijing. Responding to the stimulus (the police’s “oppression”), 
civil disobedience movement emerged again. 
To sum up, the post-1989 civil disobedience movement was the product of 
stimulus of sudden re-employment of the POO (which might be the product of the 
democratic movement in 1989 itself). With the sufficient condition, the civil 
disobedience movements emerged. However, without the favorable condition, the 
movement was not wide-spread and significant.  
                                                 
104 Political culture may be the answer, however, it cannot be measured now. So, the author would 
attribute to other possibilities.  
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4.4 Revitalizing Civil Disobedience: 2000 Anti-Public Order Ordinance 
Demonstrations 
 If the civil disobedience movement of 1992 was not significant enough in 
some eyes, the wave of the Anti-Public Order Ordinance Demonstrations in 2000 can 
certainly be counted as the first significant civil disobedience movement in Hong 
Kong history because it was the first time the “moderate democrats”105 joined. In the 
series of demonstrations held after the delayed arrest of the university students, 
legislative councilors - even the founder of the previously mentioned doctrine of 
demonstrations (the “lawful struggle”), Szeto Wah and Martin Lee - participated in 
illegal demonstrations (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000b). That’s significant in 
the history of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong for two reasons. Firstly, 
the size of participation was huge compared with the previous civil disobedience 
movements in Hong Kong.106 Even though there were just about 1,200 people at the 
peak on 8th October 2000, the number is still large in the sense that it was an illegal 
demonstration. Secondly, that was one of the few, if not the only, illegal 
demonstration participated in by the moderate democrats, who were the advocates or 
even founders of the doctrine, “lawful protest” that developed from the 1970s and 
1980s. So, this paper will now explore why this series of illegal demonstrations burst 
out. The sequence of the movements is summarized as follows.  
 
                                                 
105 What should be noted is the previous advocates on “lawful struggle” like Szeto Wah and Martin 
Lee, were there to join the “unlawful protest” (Apple Daily, 2000b). This should weigh more towards 
the significance - especially in the Hong Kong context.  
106 This thesis would count the YMT Incident as civil disobedience (even if it just fulfilled the 
minimalist definition, but not the high-end one). The movements of HKFS, carried out from 1989 to 
1992, also fulfilled the minimalist definition but only questionably the high-end definition. To Kwan 
Hang’s civil disobedience in 1992 should be seen as the one fulfilling both the minimalist and high-
end definition. It should be counted as the first civil disobedience in Hong Kong fulfilling both the 
definitions, according to author’s research. However, the number of the participants was still small. It 
was about a few hundred and confined mainly to students (To, 2014, p. 138).  
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Event No. of part. Participating Organization / 
Parties 
Police Arrest? Prosecution? 
1999. 06. 22 Anti-
Reinterpretation of Basic 
Law 
Few hundred to A 
thousand107 
- HKFS 
- Citizens Party 
- Rights of Abode Advocates 
No N/A 
2000. 04. 20 
Demonstration related to 
University Tuition Fee 
Below hundred108 - HKFS 
 
Yes, with POO (unlawful 
assembly), on 2000. 09. 29a 
No, on 2000. 
10. 05109 
2000. 06. 26 Anti-
Reinterpretation of Basic 
Law (1st Anniversary) / 
Few hundred - HKFS 
- Rights of Abode Advocates 
Yes, with POO (unlawful 
assembly), on 2000. 08. 
17110b 
No, on 2000. 
10. 25111 
                                                 
107 (Apple Daily, 1999, p. A16) 
108 (The Sun, 2000, p. SUN Current News)  
109 (Ming Pao, 2000a, p. A02) 
110 (Apple Daily, 2000, p. A09) 
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“626 Event” 
2000. 08. 19 Assembly in 
front of Police HQ 
Ten CU and HKU 
rep.112 
- HKFS 
 
- - 
2000. 08. 20 
Demonstration against 
POO 
~150 - HKCTU 
- HKFS 
- The Frontier 
- April Fifth Action113 
No N/A 
2000. 08. 27 
Demonstration against 
POO 
Less than 30114 - HKFS 
 
N/A N/A 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
111 (Wéi, 2000, p. b02) 
112 (Apple Daily, 2000a, p. A06) 
113 (Sing Tao Daily, 2000a, p. A04) (Hong Kong Daily News, 2000a, p. A06) 
114 (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000a, p. A27) 
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2000. 10. 02  
Assembly against POO 
~300 - 9 LegCo Candidates 
(including DP, HKPTU)115 
- 10 District Council mem. 
- HKFS 
No N/A 
2000. 10. 08 
Demonstration against 
POO 
~1200116 - “Old” Social Activists117 
- Legislators: Szeto Wah,118  
Cheung Man-
kwong 
Albert Ho 
- HKCTU119 
- April Fifth Action120 
No N/A 
                                                 
115 (Apple Daily, 2000b, p. A01) 
116 (Hong Kong Daily News, 2000b, p. A01) 
117 (Hong Kong Economic Times, 2000b, p. A27) 
118 Ibid. 
119 (Sing Tao Daily, 2000b, p. A01) 
120 Ibid. 
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- Mass Media rep.: Raymond 
Wong121, 
Stephen 
Shiu 
2000. 10. 15  
Demonstration against 
POO 
~300122 - HKCTU123 
- HKFS124 
- April Fifth Action125 
- NWSC126 
- Legislators127: Lee Cheuk-yan 
Emily Lau 
No N/A 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 (Hong Kong Daily News, 2000c, p. A02) 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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Lau Chin-shek 
2000. 11. 05 
Assembly against POO 
~20 - 40128129 - HKFS130 
- April Fifth Action131 
- Scholars132 
- Legislator133: James To Kun-
sun  
N/A N/A 
Table 3 The First Wave of Anti-POO Demonstrations 
a. 5 HKFS members were charged.134 They are: Yuen Hoi-yan 袁凱欣, Fung Ka-keung 馮家強, Chan King-chi 陳敬慈, Fung Kai-yuen 馮繼遠 and Cheung Wen-kay 張韻琪 
- b. 7 HKFS members were charged.135 They are: Yuen Hoi-yan 袁凱欣, Fung Ka-keung 馮家強, Chan King-chi 陳敬慈, Fung Kai-yuen 馮繼遠, Cheung Wen-kay 張韻
琪, Chu Kong-wai 朱江瑋 and Siu Yu-kwan蕭裕均.HKFS: Hong Kong Federation of Students 香港專上學生聯會 
                                                 
128 (Ming Pao, 2000b, p. A05) 
129 (Sing Tao Daily, 2000c, p. A05) 
130 Ibid.  
131 Ibid.  
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid.  
134 (The Sun, 2000, p. SUN Current News) 
135 (Sing Pao Daily News, 2000, p. A01) 
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- Citizens Party 民權黨 
- POR: Public Order Ordinance 公安條例 
- HKCTU: Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions 香港職工會聯盟 
- The Frontier 前線 
- April Fifth Action 四五行動 
- DP: Democratic Party 民主黨 
- HKPTU: Hong Kong Professional Teachers’ Union 香港教育專業人員協會 
- “Old” Social Activists: Richard Tsoi 蔡耀昌, Lui Tai-lok 呂大樂, Cheung Bing-leung 張炳良, Fung Ho-Mak Hoi-Wah 麥海華, Yip Kin-yuen 葉建源 
- NWSC: Neighborhood and Workers Services Centre 街坊工友服務處 
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4.4.1 A Calculated Response: “we have never planned to do so” 
 As one can see from the above table, the series of demonstrations aiming at 
the POO was agitated by the arrest of the HKFS members on 26th June 2000 and 29th 
September 2000 respectively. The related demonstrations they participated in were 
not aimed at the POO, but university tuition fees and the 1st anniversary of the 
reinterpretation of the Basic Law.  
By interviewing two of the seven university students arrested and charged, the 
emergence of the series of civil disobedience movement has been elucidated. That’s 
coherent with the previous discussion in this chapter, where the emergence of civil 
disobedience movement is still seen as a calculated response (facing the sudden 
change of sociopolitical environment, acts after weighing the cost/benefit). It was not 
a process from thought to action. One may know, after 1989 when To Kwan Hang 
announced that participants would not apply for permissions, that similar decisions 
had become a tradition of the HKFS. However, this would be reviewed annually and 
the committee would be left to decide for themselves whether they would follow the 
tradition. As Fung Ka Keung and Chu Kong Wai136 both mentioned: 
“Basically, we would discuss the annual plan when we have the first meeting of the Standing 
Committee. That would for sure include whether apply the permit or not, and basically we 
won’t apply…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013). 
“We would discuss this issue every year. It is a must. We cannot do it just because the previous 
committee did it. It is the core reason of student’s participation in movements. In certain sense, 
this reflected the values behind, which are the independent thinking and the democratic belief” 
(Chu, 2014).  
                                                 
136 Both Fung Ka Keung and Chu Kong Wai were one of the seven members of HKFS arrested on 26 th 
June 2000 (the 626 Event). Fung Ka Keung later mentioned that he was also involved in the case of 
the university tuition fees protests that happened on 20th April 2000 (the 420 Event).  
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Although they both agreed that the Public Order Ordinance was on their 
agenda, does it mean the emergence of civil disobedience movement at the year was 
the result of their planning? The answer is negative. According to Fung Ka Keung:  
“At 2000, we did not have an agenda to challenge the Public Order Ordinance. We were just 
routinely not applying from the Police, but we did not plan to put the POO into first priority. 
We were focusing on the commercialization of education…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).  
It means that it was not an active plan for the HKFS to carry out civil 
disobedience movement on a specific day, but a calculated response. This interesting 
point needs more discussion. How did the relatively large scale civil disobedience 
movement (or the author calls it significant) emerge? 
It happened after the delayed charges were brought against the university 
students that had participated in two demonstrations, which were not aimed at the 
POO (The Sun, 2000). Asking the two participants about their psychological 
preparation at the time, we get a more convincing answer that supports the idea that 
they had not expected to be charged, never mind planned to challenge the POO.  
“We have not expected being charged. It should be said in this way. We knew that it was 
possible, but not prepared that would happen on us…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013). 
“We have not expected being charged. The environment at the time was not that tense, not 
much charge would be put on activists…” (Chu, 2014). 
As to the means of protest, there was a difference:  
“As a citizen, our demand is simple. We just want to let our voice heard. … At the time, the 
normal way of protest was just to let the letter received by some officials at the entrance, and 
that’s done. We were not going to disobey anyone or any law…” (Chu, 2014).  
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It was after the sudden arrest of the students that the focus and the means of 
protest of society and the HKFS itself were swiftly shifted: 
“After being charged, we deliberately challenge it by not applying it…” (Chu, 2014). 
This is a very crucial point. The later series of civil disobedience movements 
directly challenging the Public Order Ordinance was purely a result of the sudden 
arrest of the students. This act of the police had aroused the attention of the public to 
the law. According to Chu, this act had stimulated a nerve of the “backbone”137 of 
Hong Kong society - arousing their memory of the students’ movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s and also the nightmare of 1989. The university students of 2000 were the 
bottom line of their comfort zone. Once the university students were being touched, 
they could feel the danger (Chu, 2014).  
On the emergence of a relatively large scale civil disobedience, Chu has his 
own explanation: 
“(Firstly,) the society had experienced a political awakening since 1980s. For how much, that 
is hard to weight. But at least, since 1989, people in Hong Kong had put more focus on 
whether they would been silenced and whether blood had been been shed for the expression of 
different opinions. … This worry had been intensified since 1997…” (Chu, 2014).  
The worry had originated from the nightmare experience of 1989. A change of 
political culture (the detailed discussion of the change in political culture will be left 
to the last chapter). This worry had been exacerbated by these first arrests since 
handover of university students. Chu has a special explanation for the people’s 
sensitive response: 
                                                 
137 He uses this word to describe those elites at the time that had experienced the students’ movement 
in the 1960s and 1970s, and the massacre of 1989 (Chu, 2014).  
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“At the time, there was a saying, ‘Wow, they would even arrest the students?’ This was the 
implanted ideology originated from the 1970s social movements. From Diao Yu Island, to anti-
corruption movement and to later pressure groups movements, university students had their 
footprints. The participants or observers has now been the backbone of the media sector, 
cultural sector, educational and professional sectors. They would think ‘university students’ as 
their bottom line” (Chu, 2014). 
The explanation given here by Chu is not really a scientific investigation, but a 
speculation of a participant. It might not be refutable, but it still acts as a possible 
explanation for the change of political culture after 1989.  
Maybe the political culture had really changed in the above way. But still, we 
can understand the arrest on students in the perspective of cost/benefit analysis. The 
arrest on students was very costly in the eyes of the sympathizers. It represented a 
new way of governance linking to the event in 1989. This is a cost they don’t want to 
bear, a cost even larger than the cost brought by participating in civil disobedience 
movements. Also, through ways other than civil disobedience movements, the aim, 
changing the law, would be impossible. So, they participated in the movements.  
The civil disobedience movements in 2000 was again a result of the sufficient 
condition. Its significance can be understood in changing political culture or 
existence of favorable condition (institutional deficit). Institutional deficit is quite 
convincing especially when quite a lot of legislators had participated in the 
movement.  
On the other side, the reasons behind the action taken by the government are 
worth discussing in this chapter. To Kwan Hang explained the different attitude 
taken by the government was the result of pressure from China, exemplified by the 
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change of the director of Xinhua News Agency. This time, why had the government 
acted so vigorously with the university students? 
Fung Ka Keung has his own explanation:  
“They charged us not because of the participation in the 626 event,138 but because of the arson 
at the Immigration Department.139 The charge was the opportunistic oppression after the arson 
by the new immigrant…” (Fung K.-k. , 2013).  
As we can see from the Table 3, the date the HKFS members were arrested was 
17th August 2000 (Apple Daily, 2000, p. A09). That’s after the arson happened on 2nd 
August 2000. So, Fung’s idea is that, after the arson, Hong Kong people had a bad 
impression of the new immigrants. The government officials of the time, especially 
Ip Lau Suk Yi, did not want these people staying in Hong Kong. So, they took the 
chance to oppress the new immigrants and the related supporters together (Fung K.-
k. , 2013).140 As one may know, the HKFS had participated enthusiastically in the 
fight for the rights of abode of those new immigrants.141 
Another explanation is that the arrest was coincidently only a few days before 
National Day, and was designed to act as a deterrent to the activists who might think 
about protesting on National Day (The Sun, 2000).  
                                                 
138 Here he means the protest against the 1st anniversary of Anti-Reinterpretation of Basic Law on 26th 
June 2000.  
139 The arson was conducted on 2nd August 2000, in the building of the Immigration Department. In 
the accident, one officer of the Immigration Department, Leung Kam-kong, was killed (Hong Kong 
Daily News, 2000, p. A06). After that, the violent acts had been denounced seriously (Wen Wei Po, 
2000, p. A03).  
140 And from some radical pro-Beijing newspapers, we can see where the arrow aimed at. For instance, 
some political parties and the people “seducing” the devastating struggle should be responsible (Wen 
Wei Po, 2000, p. A03). Also, the arson was claimed not as a coincidence, but a “necessary result” of 
the “cooperation between the ‘Anti-Tung Chin-wah’ power and the smugglers” (Wen Wei Po, 2000, p. 
A04) 
141 Some scholars have even speculated that the arrest was revenge on the students after the arson in 
their joint signatures (Apple Daily, 2000c, p. A08). 
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Whatever the reason behind the sudden arrests (in both To’s case and this case), 
the government’s sudden employment of the law seemed to reveal the illegitimacy of 
the law itself, which in turn provided an opportunity for the activists to challenge the 
law by directly violating it. The reason behind the government’s reemployment of 
the law is unknown and needs further investigation. However, the emergence of civil 
disobedience movements (in To’s case and this case also) was the direct result of the 
reemployment. The reemployment drew the attention of the public to the 
arbitrariness of the law, and in turn contributed to participation in civil disobedience. 
In other words, the reemployment echoes the “delegitimizing effect” mentioned in 
the case of India, which gave the opposition a higher moral ground. Although the 
government was not massacring anyone, the sudden arrests at a sensitive moment 
drew more accusations142 by the media and aroused skepticism in the public. 
                                                 
142 For instance, (Apple Daily, 2000c, p. A08) regarded the sudden arrest of the students after the 
arson in early August as being an oppression of the students’ movement -  using the public disgrace of 
the new immigrants. Another newspaper (The Sun, 2000) maintained that another arrest of students on 
29th September 2000 resembled the practices of the Mainland.  
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
Interviewee/ Incident Is/ isn’t civil disobedience Reasons on emergence or non-emergence provided by interviewees 
Chan Shuk Hing/ Yau Ma 
Tei Boat People Incident 
Minimalist  The law was too arbitrary and irrational. So, that’s too easy to violate, even 
they don’t have the idea (civil disobedience) in mind.  
Fung Ho Lup Not employed related 
means, but via the 
international pressure143 
 Political system was comparatively open.  
 Different focuses rather than the law 
 Government had seldom used the law. 
To Kwan Hang/ 1992. 06. 
04 Protest at Xin Hua 
News Agency Building 
Maximalist  Awakened by the June 4th Incident, on the possibility of “unlawful struggle”.  
 Government suddenly reemployed the POO to arrest the activists. To Kwan-
hang speculated that was the result of the pressure from China.   
Fung Ka Keung/ 2000 
Anti-POO 
Maximalist  A calculated response to the government’s sudden reemployment of POO.  
 The reason why government reemployed the law was the aim to oppress the 
movement after the arson happened in the Immigration Department.  
                                                 
143 That means the 39 international NGOs sent their enquiries to the Hong Kong Government about their concern regarding the YMT Incident. That was after SOCO exposed 
the situation of Hong Kong to them (Fung H.-l. , 2013). 
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 People had more concern or protection on the universities students at the time.  
Chu Kong Wai/ 2000 Anti- 
POO 
Maximalist  A calculated response to the government’s sudden reemployment of POO 
 The reason people had more protection on universities students was the 
backbone of society had experienced the social movements led by students. 
They knew the importance of that.  
Table 4 Chapter Summary
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From the above table that summarizes the core content of this chapter, we can 
see that the emergence of civil disobedience movements challenging the POO was, in 
fact, a calculated response. Firstly, the minimalist civil disobedience movement was 
the response to the government’s sudden employment of the law to deter the acts of 
the activists. As they had not applied for permission for years, they considered it 
irrational to do so. They naturally disobeyed the commands of the police. Although 
the interviewees recognized that they were not carrying out a civil disobedience 
movement consciously, they had disobeyed the law nonviolently and publicly. So, 
that fulfilled a part of the comprehensive definition of civil disobedience and the 
author called it minimalist civil disobedience movement.  
In the 1980s, until 1989 (conservatively speaking it could be until 1992),144 the 
POO had not been challenged by civil disobedience movements. Even the ‘victim’ of 
the Yau Ma Tei Incident, Fung Ho Lup had not employed this means of challenging 
the law. Except for challenging the law in the courts, what had been used was the 
international pressure on the government from different international NGOs. Fung 
explained that the means was not appropriate. The opening of the political system 
had provided other possible ways (in other words, absence of favorable condition). 
Inherited from the 1970s, their main focus was on different policy aspects and 
handover and, more importantly, they had not been arrested with the law again. .  
The employment of civil disobedience movement by To Kwan Hang illustrated 
very well the nature of this means. Deviating from the doctrine, ‘lawful struggle’, To 
had been inspired by the scene of the June 4th incident. Although being inspired by it, 
                                                 
144 It is because the author of this thesis can only conduct with To Kwan Hang in that series of civil 
disobedience from 1989 to 1992. To Kwan-hang participated in civil disobedience consciously in 
1992. He described the period from 1989 to 1992 as a period of discussion (To, 2014). However, 
according to the author’s research (see Table 2), there were some movements conducted before the 
Xinhua News Agency Buildings at the time which were similar to the requirements of the minimalist 
definition.  
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the means was not employed as the direct result of the thought. The employment was 
the direct result and a calculated response to the oppression of government, which 
provided a chance for the activists to reveal the illegitimacy of the law to the public. 
The government oppression, in To’s eyes, was an opportunistic calculation which 
avoided embarrassing the British Government. However, the challenge had not 
successfully aroused the conscientiousness of the majority to join their disobedience. 
To Kwan-hang explains that with the lagging political culture, the author of this 
thesis incline to believe in the absence of favorable condition (political system was 
undergoing reform). Later on, the law had been amended by Chris Patten and the 
attitude of severe oppression had been directed towards the activists.  
The reemployment of the POO did not take place until a few years after 
handover. As admitted by the two interviewees participating in the significant civil 
disobedience movements in 2000, the emergence was also a calculated response. The 
relatively large scale participation was the result of the “delegitimizing effect” of the 
arrest of the university students. Both of the interviewees involved in this incident 
admitted that the university students had still enjoyed the “protection”145 that is no 
longer enjoyed by students. The arrest of the university students had triggered the 
political sensitivity of the backbone of the society, who had experienced the 1970s 
student movements, pressure groups politics, the Sino-British negotiations and the 
June 4th incident (in their eyes, it would be the very cost they cannot bear). Also, the 
absence of favorable condition contributed to the significance as the pace of political 
reform after Handover was obviously slowed down comparing with the last few 
years of British rule.   
                                                 
145 That’s a word used by my interviewee, Chu Kong Wai, on his description of the severe response of 
the public when they knew that university students were arrested due to the peaceful assembly. He 
thinks that there was a “protection” of the students at the time, which is not enjoyed by students 
nowadays (Chu, 2014).  
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To sum up, the reasons for the emergence of civil disobedience movements 
against the POO were multi-factored. It was a calculated response to the sufficient 
condition “delegitimizing effect” - in this case the government employment of the 
law in each of the cases above. Also, its significance was dependent on the existence 
of favorable condition. The more favorable conditions are, the more significance of 
civil disobedience movement is.    
The insight brought by this chapter is that, the emergences of the civil 
disobedience movements above were all due to the response to stimuli. The first 
instance, the YMT Incident, a minimalist civil disobedience movement, was not 
transplanted from foreign ideas. However, the emergence of maximalist civil 
disobedience movement after 1989 was learnt from students’ movements in Beijing, 
but still stimulated by the reemployment of the law. The significance was confined 
by the lagging political culture and the absence of favorable condition.  
It sheds some light on the investigation of civil disobedience, to which the 
investigation of the great thinkers like Gandhi and Martin Luther King was important, 
but the sociopolitical conditions leading to emergences should have a larger share of 
intellectual interest.  
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Chapter 5 Implication 
5.1 Revision of Hypothesis 
Necessary 
Condition 
Existence of (quasi-) civil society in which freedom of speech 
is protected by law 
Sufficient Condition the Delegitimizing Effect 
Has the hypothesis drawn from the cases in Nazi Germany and India above 
been refuted by the empirical study carried out in chapters 3 and 4? The answer is no, 
but it has been refined. The emergence of civil disobedience in Hong Kong has 
followed the hypothesis as assumed. Civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong 
emerged with the legitimizing effect provided the existence of (quasi-) civil society. 
However, to explain the emergence of civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong 
better, one more point has to be added to the hypothesis for a general explanation of 
civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong - which will then be able to be refuted 
in the future by other studies.  
Collected from the interviews with the initiators of the Citizens’ Radio, there 
are some factors mentioned which are neither necessary nor sufficient. They are just 
favorable conditions. It is about the justifiability and the significance of the civil 
disobedience movements. And these points have been raised in the debate on civil 
disobedience. They can be used to explain if the civil disobedience movements 
emerged wide-spread or not, but not better explain the emergence of civil 
disobedience movements. Their roles can now be illustrated with the support of 
empirical findings.  
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Firstly, the most obvious defense made by the initiators is that there was no 
other normal or legal way out.146 We can call it the “last resort argument”. This “last 
resort argument” has been raised by my interviewee in the Citizens’ Radio Incident. 
It was equal to the favorable condition called “institutional deficit”. In fact, that 
cannot explain the emergence of the Citizens’ Radio (at least not in the sense that it 
happened immediately upon the initiators feeling that there was no way out). It can, 
however, better justify the launch of civil disobedience. So, we can put it under the 
title of the favorable condition.  
The second favorable condition found isthe stronger constitutional and legal 
ground encouraged the activists to consider the launch of civil disobedience 
movements (again - that the emergence was not the immediate result). The stronger 
constitutional ground (e.g. supported by the HKBORO or Basic Law) encouraged to 
activists to bear the risk of launching civil disobedience movements. And the risk of 
imprisonment was smaller because they had a stronger argument in the courts to 
avoid being jailed. It then minimizes the cost activists would bear with the launch of 
civil disobedience movements. Also, the stronger constitutional ground can convince 
more sympathizers to participate or to inspire them as a moral education. In the view 
of benefit, the stronger constitutional ground is likely to make larger benefit.  
So, the hypothesis can be summarized as follows:  
Necessary 
Condition 
Existence of civil society in which freedom of speech is 
protected by law 
Favorable Institutional deficits 
                                                 
146 We can see it from the “second condition” of John Rawls and the “closed political system” of Lui 
and Chiu.  
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Condition Stronger constitutional ground 
Sufficient Condition the Delegitimizing Effect 
Inspired by the Resource Mobilization (RM) theory and the Political 
Opportunity Structure theory in the study of social movement in sociology, we can 
follow its perspective treating social actors as “conscious actors making rational 
choices” (Diani & Della Porta, 1999, p. 9). Although the theory was not invented to 
explain the emergence of civil disobedience movements, it has allowed analysts to 
study the relationship between the sociopolitical condition and the “type and nature” 
of resources in activists’ hands and their tactical choices (Diani & Della Porta, 1999, 
p. 8).  
So, in the eyes of initiators of civil disobedience movements, what resources 
would be needed for a mobilization of civil disobedience movements? Among the 
RM theorists, resources may be distinguished into “material resources” (work, 
money, concrete benefits, services) and “non-material resources” (authority, moral 
engagement, faith, friendship) (Diani & Della Porta, 1999, p. 8).  
As a special way of protest, civil disobedience may require some resources 
more than others. To participate in a civil disobedience movement, one has to stand 
firm in one’s moral beliefs (about what’s right or wrong) and be willing to accept the 
consequent punishment. The cost would be imprisonment or the possible violence 
faced. The benefit would be their aim, like change of the law or policy and the moral 
education of others. So, the non-material resources like moral engagement147 or 
moral courage are needed, which means how firm they would stand for their moral 
                                                 
147 Moral engagement is a “…commitment to behaving morally… despite social pressures to 
participate in or passively comply with policies and actions.” (Moral engagement: Introduction, 2010) 
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belief. When more people are willing to engage with the “morality” and sacrifice, 
they are more likely to participate in civil disobedience movements.  
What would affect the cost and benefit of the decision to stand firm in one’s 
moral stance? The answer lies in the previous chapters: the sociopolitical condition. 
It is the condition that affects one’s rational calculation on whether to initiate or 
participate in civil disobedience or not. This is inspired by the Political Opportunity 
Structure theory putting their focus on environment affecting the rational calculation.  
Types of 
Condition 
Conditions Cost / Benefit148 
Necessary 
Condition 
Existence of (quasi-) civil society in which 
freedom of speech (and certain level of 
freedom of association) is protected by law 
-ve / +ve 
Favorable 
Condition 
Institutional deficits 
Stronger constitutional ground 
N/A / +ve 
Sufficient 
Condition 
the Delegitimizing Effect N/A / +ve 
 
In this last chapter, the author would like to explain how these conditions were 
formed in the historical context of Hong Kong. In other words, what were the 
historical forces behind the respective sociopolitical conditions contributing to the 
emergence? 
                                                 
148 Let’s assume cost here includes life, property, freedom, etc. And benefit includes the change of the 
unjust law, the success of moral education, etc.  
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5.2 The existence of (quasi-) civil society in Hong Kong 
As defined in section 1.2.4, the working definition of civil society can be 
summarized into a few indicators: 1) autonomy from state and economy; 2) openness 
(above all of the intimate sphere like family, which is closed); 3) relying on 
voluntary participation; 4) freedom for citizens to communicate and associate. 
From when did this kind of society exist in Hong Kong? According to the 
scholars studying the development of civil society in Hong Kong, we had bottom-up 
Kai Fong associations handling the issues relating to the Chinese population, which 
mediated between the Chinese in Hong Kong, the colonial government and even the 
Chinese government. A classic example of this kind of association, and one that 
illustrates their function well, is the one at Man Mo Temple (Chan K.-m. , 2010).  
However, even though there was a lot of bottom-up associations and charity 
organizations in Hong Kong before the 1960s, “civil society”149 had not emerged or 
was too weak in its civil-ness. In other words, there was indeed some public space 
for the Chinese to organize, but this public space had not been used to fight with the 
colonial government for interests or used for mobilization. This “political stability” 
has been explained by different scholars from different perspectives.150 We could 
even say that there were voluntary organizations existing before the 1960s, but 
society (civil or “Minjian”) was heavily depoliticized. It did not fulfil the basic 
function of a civil society, in which arena better public lives could be pursued. So, if 
                                                 
149 According to Chan, “Minjian shehui” (民間社會) would be more appropriate to be used for 
describing the shape of Chinese society in Hong Kong before 1967, especially for its depoliticized 
character (Chan K.-m. , 2010). The collective movements in the public realm were still severely 
controlled by the colonial government before the 1960s. At the same time, the apathy towards public 
life shared by the Chinese residents and refugees was common. This made the civil society very weak, 
if it existed at all.  
150 For instances see Lau’s “utilitarianistic familism”, “minimally-integrated socio-political system” 
(1983), King’s “administrative absorption” (1981)and Hoadley’s “refugee mentality” (1974).  
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we cannot refute entirely the existence of civil society in Hong Kong before the 
1960s, it could only be described as a very underdeveloped one.  
The watershed in its development is the 1967 Riot. Shocked by the communists, 
but with social inequality well exposed, the identity of the Hong Kong people was 
changed. It was characterized by the post-war baby boomers refusing the identity of 
“refugee”, articulating their strong criticisms of corruption, housing problems, the 
labor environment, education and public services, and demanding cultural 
recognition (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 159). The student movements that emerged in the 
1970s had shown civil society was in formation or being activated. It was also a 
change in political culture that departed from the “utilitarianistic familism” or 
“refugee mentality” and that was so well recognized before.  
So, though it is hard to weigh to what extent civil society existed, the 
characteristics (autonomous, open, participated voluntarily and free to communicate 
and associate151) of it had been shown in the series of social movements preceding 
the Yau Ma Tei Boat People Incident in 1979.  
The YMT Incident happened in this historical context. The participant, Chan 
Shun-hing, was at the time a university student. That exactly suits the situation 
mentioned above.  
The first emergence of civil disobedience movement (though not maximalist 
one) was a response to the sudden employment of the POO. It had its roots in the 
historical context. In the 1970s, the citizenship was undergoing expansion and 
expanding through different kinds of movements (urban, students, anti-corruption, 
                                                 
151 Although that had been restricted from time to time, generally people can gather collectively. Only 
in those cases in which government would like to oppress, the freedom of association is rather 
confined. Nonetheless, it is not comparable to the cases in Nazi Germany.  
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housing etc.). Their rights in these aspects were also undergoing expansion with new 
social movements rising to challenge the status quo. And during these contentions, 
there was a “…loosely knit network of pressure groups, social movement 
organizations, and grassroots protest groups…” forming (Lui T.-l. &., 1997, p. 105). 
There was awareness that the problem of police oppression using the POO could 
potentially be suffered by these groups. The YMT incident can be characterized as 
just one of the groups setting themselves against this (and there may be more 
instances that we don’t know of - further investigation should be done). With the 
expansion of citizenship, the right to protest is a natural product. This was the right 
that had been challenged in the case of YMT boat people.  
However, this kind of challenge, as we have observed, was not wide-spread 
afterwards. This can be explained with a multi-factored approach that includes the 
absence of the re-employment of law and the opening of the political system. These 
contributed to the absence of civil disobedience movements in the early and mid-
1980s.  
If the government did not employ the law to arrest the dissenters, there were no 
sure grounds to go against it. However, the absence of civil disobedience movements 
in the period can also be explained by the opening of the political system, which 
drew the dissenters into the institutional channels. The previously sole way, protest, 
was now the supplement of institutional politics. The pressure groups had to choose 
between participation through institutional channels or continuing to fight on the 
streets. According to Chan, a very large part of the social movement organizations 
turned to elections (Chan K.-m. , 2010, p. 156).  
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The June 4th Incident in 1989 had inspired somebody in Hong Kong on the 
possibility of illegal struggle. However, when To Kwan-hang launched his civil 
disobedience movements after 1989, he did not have much support. This is due to the 
political culture or the lack of favorable condition (political system was still 
undergoing reform and opening). Also, other protests launched by those prominent 
political elites in the council had been the other ways out for dissent on June 4th 
Incident. After 1989, there was “full-power mobilization” for once, but that was 
mobilized by political organizations, rather than from the bottom-up like those of the 
1970s (Chan K.-m. , 2010). The political elites were still caught in the dilemma of 
choosing between legislative councils and the streets. To’s case may characterize the 
minority awakened by June 4th to a launch non-institutional struggle.  
In the case of 2000, the launch of civil disobedience movement was first held 
by members of civil societies (like the HKFS) and then later joined by the members 
of political society (like legislators). The existence of civil society as a necessary 
condition has not been refuted by these cases. Also, the sufficient condition, 
delegitimizing effect, causes civil disobedience movements to emerge. But for why 
this series of movement is relatively significant, the favorable conditions have to be 
taken into consideration. 
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5.3 Institutional Deficit 
The institutional deficit, mostly claimed by the initiators, is in fact not a 
condition that explains the emergence of civil disobedience, but a condition 
favoring/justifying the act or affecting their significance. Have those cases of 
significant civil disobedience movements in Hong Kong happened at times when 
institutional deficits are obvious?  
In the 1970s, the newly emerged pressure groups, students and grassroots 
organizations organized protests to attract media coverage and then to put pressure 
on government. This, as a non-institutional means, has been explained by Lui and 
Chiu (1997) with the argument of the “closed political system”. The relatively 
limited channels to the establishment have “forced” groups to resort to protest, in a 
way unfamiliar to the kai-fong groups and the Mutual Aid Committees (Chan K.-m. , 
2010, p. 153).  
The opening of the closed political system due to decolonization drew 
discontent into the institutions. The 1st District Board was established in 1982. One 
third of it was generated by elections (Ma, 2010, p. 23). Urban Council elections 
followed in 1983. Later, in 1985, 12 seats of functional constituency were even 
added into the Legislative Council. It marked the starting point of indirect elections 
in the Legislative Council (Ma, 2010, p. 23). In 1991, direct election was established 
in the LegCo election (Ma, 2010, p. 23). 
The former skepticism of the social activists had been swept away as time 
passed. The interviewees mentioned in the case of the YMT Incident both claimed 
that they had been invited to join the elections and that they did plan to join (Chan 
S.-h. , 2013) (Fung H.-l. , 2013). The opening of the political system had released the 
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momentum for further democratization, which was oppressed in the 1970s. The other 
problems had been left aside. Institutional progress was now the main thrust of 
reform.  
When To Kwan-hang carried out his civil disobedience movements, this 
favorable condition was not that obvious. This was because, at the time, the 
influence of pan-democrats in the councils was high and especially significant in 
1991. In 1991, in 18 seats elected directly, 16 seats had been gained by the pro-
democracy camp (UDHK: 12; MP: 2; HKADPL: 1; Independent: 1) (Li, 2000, p. 
189). Also, in 1995, the pan-democrats gained 12 seats out of 14 candidates (Lo, 
1997, p. 182). Lo also commented that “…clearly, the DP’s pre-1997 strategy was to 
struggle for democratization through winning as many as possible of the directly 
elected seats in the legislature…” (Lo, 1997, p. 182).  
The strategy employed by the “pan-democrats” from 1989 to 1997 was a far 
cry from the strategy employed by the students like To Kwan-hang at the time. To’s 
strategy had not been supported by the majority of the pan-democrats.  
More serious institutional deficit was experienced in the post-1997 era, 
however, not as a minority in seats but as a constraint by constitution. Stipulated by 
the Basic Law, the post-1997 system was characterized as “executive-led”, which 
was “derived from the colonial era” (Zhang, 2009, p. 315). In the articles, the Basic 
Law “…restrict(ed) the power of LegCo to prevent it from being the equal of the 
chief executive…” and meant that “…most government polices do not need the 
approval of the legislature unless they involve changing laws or appropriations…” 
(Zhang, 2009, p. 316). The power to initiate a bill152 is still controlled by the 
                                                 
152 Basically by Article 74. Ability to pass a bill is confined by separation of vote.  
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executive, and even a bill that has been passed by the LegCo needs to be signed by 
the Chief Executive (Zhang, 2009, p. 316). The Basic Law has largely confined the 
constitutional power of the Legislators to initiate bills. 
It seems that it was harder to launch a reform through the Legislative Council 
post-1997 than it was pre-1997. Before 1997, a member’s bill was an influential 
weapon for legislators. This weapon was used to launch policy that was not in line 
with government policy (Ma, 2010, p. 89). From 1995153 to 1997, legislators tabled 
53 member’s bills and 26 of them were passed, which was 23.2 % of the total 
number of bills. However, after 1997 (from 1998 to 2004), legislators tried to put up 
29 member’s bills, but only 12 of them were tabled and passed, which was only 2.6 
% of the total number of bills put. What’s more important is that 11 out of the 12 
member’s bills passed were Private Bills, which are not related to governmental 
policy (Ma, 2010, pp. 89-90). This change was the mixed result of the stipulations of  
Article 74 in the Basic Law and the separation of the vote. 
Under this historical context of severe institutional constraints, it is not hard to 
understand why there were a lot of legislative members participating in civil 
disobedience movements during 2000. They included Szeto Wah, Martin Lee, Albert 
Ho, Cheung Man-kwong, Lee Cheuk-yan, Emily Lau, Lau Chin-shek and James To 
Kun-sun. The vigorous participation can be explained through many factors, but the 
institutional deficit faced by these legislators is certainly be one of them.  
So, the institutional deficit, although not a direct factor affecting when and how 
civil disobedience emerged, was an important condition that made civil disobedience 
                                                 
153 Before 1995, this means was not prominent. In 1991, Martin Lee was the first legislator in history 
to initiate a member’s bill relating to public policy (Chau, 1995).  
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significant. And when this institutional deficit was felt widely, the participation was 
greater. 
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5.4 Stronger Constitutional Ground 
Also as a favorable condition, the stronger constitutional ground can encourage 
initiation and participation into civil disobedience. In the context of Hong Kong, the 
establishment of the HKBORO and the Basic Law has been an encouragement to 
activists on employing the means of civil disobedience (Leung K.-h. , 2013).  
In the case of To Kwan-hang, he admitted that the establishment of the 
HKBORO had given him more confidence to challenge the law in court (after being 
arrested in a civil disobedience) (To, 2014). What’s more interesting is that at the 
time he had a chance to accept “binding-over”. To Kwan-hang decided to go on and 
to risk his freedom and challenge the legality of the situation (To, 2014). 
So, in practice, the establishment of the favorable laws have encouraged the 
activists to consider employing civil disobedience due to the lower cost. It is because 
civil disobedience cannot act as a defending argument in court but there are laws 
supporting their acts and protecting their freedoms. In other words, stronger legal 
grounds may be provided to the dissenters. It would then act as a favorable condition, 
which lessened the cost of mobilization. 
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5.5 The Delegitimizing Effect 
As the most direct and immediate condition affecting the emergence of civil 
disobedience, the delegitimizing effect is a special condition inviting dissenters to 
carry out civil disobedience. As a special way of protest highly related to morality, if 
something happens to expose and denounce the moral grounds of the authorities 
(legitimacy is then be harmed), civil disobedience is the means that attacks most 
straightly the weak point of the authorities.  
In all the cases studied, the YMT Incident, the post-1989 civil disobedience led 
by To Kwan-hang, the Anti-POO demonstration in 2000 and the Citizens’ Radio all 
happened immediately after a delegitimizing event. Respectively, it was the re-
/employment of the POO (arrest on students) for the first three cases and the 
censorship on Cheng and Wong in the latter. Whatever name one calls them, the 
events happening immediately before have drawn the intense focus of the civil 
society and rationalized the emergence of civil disobedience movements. 
The emergence of a delegitimizing effect has enhanced the moral ground of the 
activists or degraded the moral ground of their opponent, government. The enhanced 
moral ground of activists has not only drawn attention from the public but also asked 
them to respond with their moral engagement. In this way, the non-material resource 
(moral engagement) has acted as a resource for mobilization for this specific kind of 
means. This is crucial to distinguish this kind of protest means from others154. This 
resource has urged activists to choose civil disobedience for attaining their goal.  
                                                 
154 In the light shed by John Rawls, the final impression of civil disobedience movement matters. 
Rawls agreed that civil disobedience movement should be nonviolent, “not from the abhorrence of the 
use of force in principle, but because it is a final expression of one’s case” (Rawls, 1971, p. 106). In 
the same vain, civil disobedience movement leaders should present their movement nonviolently, and 
at their best to avoid being labelled as striving for personal interest. If they can present their 
movement in this way, more likely the participation rate will be higher. And civil disobedience 
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However, for what reason the delegitimizing effect has happened, it has been 
ad hoc. In the case of To Kwan-hang, the sudden reemployment of the POO was 
claimed to be the result of the change of the Chinese officials heading the Xinhua 
News Agency, which in turn putt pressure on the Colonial government (To, 2014). In 
the case of the Anti-POO demonstration of 2000, the arrest of students was 
speculated by Fung to be an “opportunistic oppression” of the students’ movement 
when a bad impression of new immigrants was given to the public by the arson 
(Fung K.-k. , 2013). So, whatever the reason behind the reemployment, the 
reemployment itself set a sufficient condition for the emergence of civil disobedience. 
                                                                                                                                          
movement is a process of moral education, one can imagine one without integrity or weak on moral 
ground would be harder, if not impossible to ask for other’s participating in an illegal movement out 
of conscience. To be remarked here, the author of this thesis is not asking the initiator of civil 
disobedience movements to be a saint, but it is needed for the movements to be presented as 
something originated from conscience, but not out of personal interest. And this is the reason why the 
final impression of a civil disobedience movement would be attacked by their opponent as “impure” 
movement (like the Occupy Central movement being linked to agenda behind like US involvement 
This is exactly what the author of this thesis named as moral engagement.) For instance, the criticism, 
brought by Priscilla Lau Pui-king, accuses the Occupy Central movement is for “personal aim” 
sacrificing other’s interest (Lau P.-k. , 2014). This is regarded by the author of this thesis as an act 
affecting the asset of movement leaders.   
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The debate on civil disobedience has always focused on the thought of the 
initiators (like Gandhi’s and Martin Luther King’s). The sociopolitical conditions for 
the emergence of civil disobedience movements, according to the author’s research, 
have not been well systematized. The discussion in Hong Kong on that subject is 
even rarer.  
This study aims at answering under what conditions the special way of protest, 
civil disobedience, has been employed. The author of this thesis trusts that the launch 
of civil disobedience movements would be a calculated choice after weighing the 
costs and benefits of various means and that the costs and benefits are affected by the 
external environment or sociopolitical conditions listed above. So, the employment 
of civil disobedience, shown in the cases set in Hong Kong, is a response to the 
sociopolitical conditions.  
CD Max/Min Significant* Necessary Sufficient Favorable 
Yau Ma Tei 
Boat People 
Incident 
Min Relatively 
Insignificant 
Y Y Y 
Post-1989 
civil 
disobedience 
movement 
Max Insignificant Y Y N 
Civil 
disobedience 
movement 
in 2000 
Max Significant Y Y Y 
Citizens’ 
Radio 
Incident 
Max Significant Y Y Y 
*Measure only by the number of participant or if it is within the circle of minority 
only 
So, this study argues that the emergence of civil disobedience movement is a 
calculated response to certain conditions. To specify, it is the existence of (quasi-) 
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civil society protected by law as a necessary condition, and the delegitimizing effect 
as a sufficient condition. The institutional deficit and stronger constitutional ground 
are just favorable conditions affecting the significance (or the number of participants) 
of the movement. 
As shown in previous chapters, the first civil disobedience movement in the 
history of Hong Kong (according to the author’s research) emerged with the pre-
existence of (quasi-) civil society (necessary condition) and responded to the 
stimulus of police (sufficient condition). And, in the special context of 1980s Hong 
Kong, the emergence of civil disobedience movements were discouraged by the 
opening up of the political system and the sovereignty transfer. The first maximalist 
civil disobedience movements were the stimulus for the June 4th incident in 1989, 
however its significance was limited by the absence of favorable conditions. And 
civil disobedience movements again emerged with sufficient condition, supported by 
the presence of favorable condition. Later cases in the 2000s are also consistent with 
the hypothesis. So, from the cases studied, the hypothesis that “if civil society exists 
in Hong Kong, delegitimizing effect then leads civil disobedience movements to 
emerge” has not been refuted. 
As a supplement at this very end, the author of this thesis would like to have a 
little discussion on the Occupy Central movement which may happen in the near 
future (the author has been writing this thesis from Jan 2013 to Aug 2014). In fact, 
the interest of doing this whole study was aroused by the early discussion represented 
by the crucial article written by Benny Tai (Tai, 2013). And this study would like to 
contribute to the discussion as a return.  
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The contribution the author would like to make, is the previous civil 
disobedience movements in Hong Kong all pointing to the fact that civil 
disobedience movement is a response to something which the author calls it the 
delegitimizing effect. This would also greatly affect the significance of the movement.  
And the audience keeping a close track to the Occupy Central movement may 
criticize this study that we have observed a prelude of the Occupy Central movement 
on 1st July 2014. Would this refute my hypothesis? The answer is no. The author 
would like to point out that the White Paper named “The Implementation of One 
Country, Two Systems in HKSAR” published right before the 1st July 2014 may be a 
delegitimizing effect. Obviously, this is not a conclusion drawn from scientific study. 
So, this may be the limit of this study on its period covered. However, the hypothesis 
will not been refuted if the Occupy Central is really going to happen in the late 
August, after the Standing Committee of the National People Congress passing the 
report provided by the Chief Executive of HKSAR (Tai, 2014).  
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Appendix 
Table of Interviewee  
Date Name of Interviewee Position/Status in the 
concerned period 
Topics covered 
2013.09.27 Leung Kwok-hung Veteran Social Activist; 
Legco Member (2004 on); 
League of Social Democrats 
mem. (LSD) 
- Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s; 
- Citizens’ Radio 
Incident;  
- Pre-1997 civil 
disobedience 
movements  
2013.10.16 Tsang Kin-shing Veteran Social Activist; LSD - Citizens’ Radio 
Incident 
2013.10.18155 Ng Ka-sin HKFS member - Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s 
2013.10.24 Lau San-ching Veteran Social Activist; LSD - Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s 
2013.11.15 Chan Shun-hing Student - Yau Ma Tei Boat 
People Incident 
2013.12.13 Fung Ho-lup Director of SOCO - Yau Ma Tei Boat 
People Incident 
- Situation in 1980s 
2013.12.15156 Chan Sin-ying HKFS member - Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s 
2013.12.21 Fung Ka-keung HKFS member - Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s 
2014.01.02 Chu Kong-wai HKFS member - Civil disobedience 
movements in 
2000s 
2014.01.03 Leung Kwok-hung (2nd 
Interview) 
Veteran Social Activist; 
Legco Member (2004 on); 
League of Social Democrats 
mem. (LSD) 
- Pre-1997 civil 
disobedience 
movements 
2014.01.16 
 
To Kwan-hang HKFS member - Post-1989 civil 
disobedience 
movements 
 
  
                                                 
155 Have not cited 
156 Have not cited 
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